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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article surveys selected criminal law decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Florida and the Florida District Courts of Appeal published between 
August 1, 2010 and July 31, 2012.  The survey covers cases of first impres-
sion, decisions involving or identifying conflicts between the Florida District 
Courts of Appeal, questions certified to the Supreme Court of Florida as be-
ing of great public importance, and cases that clarify or expand upon existing 
principles of law.  Decisions discussing procedural and evidentiary issues 
and Florida’s sentencing guidelines are beyond the scope of this article, 
which focuses on substantive principles of criminal law. 
II. CRIMES 
A. Burglary  
1. Burglary of a Dwelling 
Burglary of a dwelling, which is a second-degree felony in Florida, in-
cludes burglary of an “attached porch.”1  In Colbert v. State,2 the issue was 
whether the area in front of the victim’s townhouse, from which the defen-
dant had taken a bicycle, was an attached porch and therefore a dwelling.3  
Noting that Florida’s judicial treatment of this term demonstrates only “what 
  
 1. FLA. STAT. §§ 810.02(3), 810.011(2) (2012); FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 13.1 
(2008). 
 2. 78 So. 3d 111 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 3. Id. at 112; see also FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2). 
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an ‘attached porch’ is not,” the First District distinguished the instant case 
from decisions dealing “with areas where common notions of security and 
privacy associated with a dwelling were present.”4  In contrast, the area from 
which the defendant had taken the bicycle, a concrete pad and mulch, “was 
open to unknown, uninvited people.”5  It was therefore not an attached 
porch.6  For this reason, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction.7 
The definition of the term “dwelling” also includes the “curtilage,”8 
which must be enclosed.9  The question of what constitutes an enclosure is 
frequently the subject of debate, however.10  In J.L. v. State,11 for example, 
the Fifth District held that items leaning against the side of a house were not 
taken from its curtilage, even though the yard was fenced on two sides, be-
cause there was no proof of the distance between these fences and the house, 
any connection between the fences, or the existence of a fence on the side of 
the house from which the property was removed.12  The court rejected the 
State’s argument “that curtilage necessarily includes an item that touches 
(but is not attached) to the house [because this] would mean that a burglary 
of a dwelling would occur if an individual took a fruit from a tree in an open 
yard when the fruit happened to be touching the house.”13  Concluding that 
this result would not comport with legislative intent,14 the court reversed the 
defendant’s burglary conviction and directed entry of judgment for trespass.15 
In Jacobs v. State,16 on the other hand, the First District held that “[t]he 
enclosure need not be continuous and an ungated opening for ingress and 
egress does not preclude” a finding that the yard is part of the curtilage.17  
  
 4. Colbert, 78 So. 3d at 112–13; see also FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2). 
 5. Colbert, 78 So. 3d at 112–13. 
 6. Id. at 113; see also FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2). 
 7. Colbert, 78 So. 3d at 113. 
 8. FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2); see FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 13.1 (2008). 
 9. FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2); see also State v. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d 1038, 1044 (Fla. 
1995). 
 10. See FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2); J.L. v. State, 57 So. 3d 924, 925–26 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2011) (quoting Hamilton, 660 So. 2d at 1044); Jacobs v. State, 41 So. 3d 1004, 1005–06 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Hamilton, 660 So. 2d at 1044), review denied, 79 So. 
3d 744 (Fla. 2012). 
 11. 57 So. 3d 924 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 12. Id. at 925–26; see also FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2). 
 13. J.L., 57 So. 3d at 926. 
 14. Id. (citing Hamilton, 660 So. 2d at 1044). 
 15. Id. 
 16. 41 So. 3d 1004 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review denied, 79 So. 3d 744 (Fla. 
2012). 
 17. Id. at 1006 (citing Chambers v. State, 700 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
1997)); see also FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2). 
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The residential yard in Jacobs was an enclosure, the court explained, because 
it was “fenc[ed] on three sides,” with a “low-walled ‘stoop’ in . . . front” and 
an “opening for the driveway.”18  The court also rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the house ceased to be a “dwelling” after it was damaged in a 
fire.19  The house, which was being restored, had a roof, floors, walls, and 
“plumbing and electric utilities [that were turned off] because the home was 
unoccupied.”20  Accordingly, the court held that the fire had not “substantial-
ly changed the character of the house to the extent that it was unsuitable for 
lodging by people.”21  As authority, the court cited Munoz v. State,22 a 
Second District opinion that was called into question in two cases during the 
survey period.23 
In Munoz, the Second District held that a house under renovation was 
not a “dwelling under the burglary statute” because the renovations rendered 
it temporarily uninhabitable.24  The court reasoned that to qualify as a “dwel-
ling,” a structure must be designed for human habitation and must not be so 
substantially changed that it becomes unsuitable for habitation.25  In Michael 
v. State,26 however, the Fifth District criticized Munoz for adding an element 
to the crime that improperly required the State to “prove that the structure 
was habitable as a dwelling on the date of the offense.”27  Instead, the Mi-
chael court adopted the dissenting opinion in Munoz,28 which had eschewed 
the majority’s reasoning on two grounds.29  First, the majority’s reasoning in 
Munoz was inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, which re-
  
 18. Jacobs, 41 So. 3d at 1006; see also Dicks v. State, 75 So. 3d 857, 858–60 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that a prosecutor’s misstatement of law during closing argument 
by defining the term “dwelling” to include a trespass on the unenclosed property surrounding 
the dwelling did not constitute fundamental error because the defendant was found beneath the 
victim’s mobile home where he was removing its copper wiring). 
 19. Jacobs, 41 So. 3d at 1005–06. 
 20. Id. at 1006. 
 21. Id. at 1007. 
 22. 937 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
 23. Young v. State (Young I), 73 So. 3d 825, 825 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per 
curiam) (certifying conflict with Munoz), review granted, 84 So. 3d 1033 (Fla. 2012); Michael 
v. State, 51 So. 3d 574, 575 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (certifying conflict with Munoz); 
Jacobs, 41 So. 3d at 1006–07 (citing Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 689). 
 24. Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 689 (citing Perkins v. State (Perkins II), 682 So. 2d 1083, 1084 
(Fla. 1996) (per curiam)). 
 25. Id. at 688–89 (relying on Perkins II, 682 So. 2d at 1084). 
 26. 51 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 27. Id. at 575; see also Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 689. 
 28. Michael, 51 So. 3d at 575. 
 29. Id.; see also Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 690–91 (Canady, J., dissenting). 
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quired only that a “dwelling” be “designed” for habitation.30  Second, it was 
inconsistent with the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Perkins v. 
State (Perkins II),31 which made clear that in determining whether a structure 
qualified as a dwelling, “‘the design of the structure’ . . . is ‘paramount.’”32  
Therefore, according to the Munoz dissent, the home’s temporary transfor-
mation had not altered its use for human habitation.33  Adopting this reason-
ing, the Michael court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for burglary of a 
dwelling and certified conflict with Munoz.34  The Fifth District again certi-
fied conflict with Munoz in Young v. State (Young I).35  The Supreme Court 
of Florida has accepted jurisdiction in Young v. State (Young II).36 
2. Ownership and Possession of the Burglarized Premises 
A victim’s ownership of the burglarized premises is a necessary “ele-
ment of the crime of burglary.”37  However, the definition of “ownership” 
under the burglary statute differs from its counterpart in property law be-
cause it requires the victim to have a possessory interest in the burglarized 
structure superior to that of the defendant.38  In Pierre v. State,39 the Third 
District reversed a conviction for burglary of an occupied dwelling on the 
ground that the State had not established the victim’s superior possessory 
interest.40  In this case, a sexual battery took place on the victim’s last night 
as a guest in an apartment leased by the defendant who was moving out of 
the premises.41  The court found no conclusive evidence that the defendant 
had abandoned his possessory interest in the apartment.42  His possessions 
  
 30. Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 690 (Canady, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Bennett, 565 So. 2d 
803, 805 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam)). 
 31. 682 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam). 
 32. Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 691 (Canady, J., dissenting) (quoting Perkins v. State (Perkins 
I), 630 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review granted per curiam, 673 So. 
2d 30 (Fla. 1996)). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Michael v. State, 51 So. 3d 574, 575 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Baker v. 
State, 636 So. 2d 1342, 1344 (Fla. 1994)). 
 35. 73 So. 3d 825, 825 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam), review granted, 84 So. 
3d 1033 (Fla. 2012); see also Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 689–90. 
 36. 84 So. 3d 1033, 1033 (Fla. 2012) (unpublished table decision). 
 37. D.S.S. v. State, 850 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 2003) (citing In re M.E., 370 So. 2d 795, 
796 (Fla. 1979)). 
 38. Pierre v. State, 77 So. 3d 699, 701 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Whetstone 
v. State, 778 So. 2d 338, 342 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000)). 
 39. 77 So. 3d 699 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 40. Id. at 702. 
 41. Id. at 700. 
 42. Id. at 702. 
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remained there, he went back and forth between the two properties, and the 
victim returned her key on her last night in the unit.43  Although a lessee’s 
legal interest in the leased premises does not conclusively establish his pos-
sessory interest, in this case, the evidence showed that the defendant’s legal 
interest in the property was superior or “at least equal to the victim’s tempo-
rary possessory interest.”44  As a result, the appellate court reversed and re-
manded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on the burglary 
count.45 
The concept of ownership was also the subject of the appeal in Morris 
v. State,46 where the Fourth District held that the victim named in the infor-
mation “did not have the requisite possessory interest in the [burglarized 
warehouse] to support” Morris’ armed burglary conviction because he was 
an employee.47  The court noted that the important distinction is between a 
“manager, who exercises lawful control over premises,” and an “employee, 
[who] occupies the space but does not control it.”48  In Morris, however, the 
named victim was not a manager; instead, he was an employee of a subsidi-
ary of the warehouse owner and did not ordinarily work at the location in 
question.49  Because “[h]is interest in the warehouse was limited to servicing 
the open distribution route,” he “did not have the requisite possessory inter-
est in the property.”50  Consequently, the court reversed the defendant’s 
armed burglary conviction.51 
3. Remaining in the Premises 
The statutory definition of burglary includes the act of remaining in the 
premises, “[n]otwithstanding a licensed or invited entry,” with intent to 
commit a forcible felony.52  In Harris v. State,53 the Fifth District held that 
“the legislative intent [of the statute] indicates that a licensed or invited entry 
is an element of a remaining in burglary,” and that this interpretation is sup-
  
 43. Id. at 700, 702. 
 44. Pierre, 77 So. 3d at 702. 
 45. Id. 
 46. 87 So. 3d 89 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 47. Id. at 91. 
 48. Id. at 90–91 (citing Adirim v. State, 350 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 
1977) (per curiam)). 
 49. Id. at 89–90. 
 50. Id. at 91. 
 51. Morris, 87 So. 3d at 91. 
 52. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1)(a)–(b) (2012). 
 53. 48 So. 3d 922 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
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ported by decisional law and the applicable standard jury instruction.54  Ac-
cordingly, a defendant who knocked on the door of a residence, then pushed 
his way in and stole money from the occupants, could not be convicted of a 
remaining in burglary under the statute because his initial entry was neither 
licensed nor invited.55 
B. Criminal Mischief 
In Marrero v. State (Marrero II),56 the Supreme Court of Florida held 
that the State must prove a specific monetary amount of damage to convict a 
defendant of felony criminal mischief and cannot rely on a “life experience” 
exception.57  This decision resolved a conflict among Florida’s District 
Courts of Appeal “as to whether the amount of damage is” a necessary ele-
ment of the offense and called into question the use of a life experience ex-
ception in any criminal statute, including theft.58  In this case, the defendant 
drove his truck through a casino entrance, requiring replacement of four tall 
impact-resistant glass doors.59  He was charged with felony criminal mischief 
under section 806.13(1)(b)(3) of the Florida Statutes, which applies only 
when the mischief causes one thousand dollars or more in damages.60  At 
trial, the State presented no “evidence of the repair or replacement costs of 
the damaged [doors].”61  The trial court therefore instructed the jury, accord-
ing to the standard theft instruction, to “attempt to determine a minimum 
value” of the damaged property.62  Marrero was convicted of felony criminal 
mischief based upon the jury’s finding “that ‘the property was [valued at] 
one thousand dollars or more.’”63  The Third District affirmed, holding that 
“‘a trial court may conclude “that certain repairs are so self-evident that the 
fact-finder could conclude based on life experience that the statutory damage 
threshold has been met.”’”64 
  
 54. Id. at 924–25 (citing FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 13.1 (2008)). 
 55. Id. at 923, 925 (reversing and remanding the judgment and sentence for burglary). 
 56. 71 So. 3d 881 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam). 
 57. Id. at 891 (citing Jackson v. State, 413 So. 2d 112, 114 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)). 
 58. Id. at 886–87, 891. 
 59. Id. at 883–84. 
 60. See id. at 884, 886 (citing FLA. STAT. § 806.13(1)(b)(3) (2012)). 
 61. Marrero II, 71 So. 3d at 884. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 884–85. 
 64. Marrero v. State (Marrero I), 22 So. 3d 822, 823 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (quot-
ing T.B.S. v. State, 935 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)), review granted, 29 So. 3d 
291 (Fla. 2010), and quashed, 71 So. 3d 881 (Fla. 2011). 
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The Supreme Court of Florida reversed and remanded for entry of a 
judgment for misdemeanor criminal mischief.65  Application of the “life ex-
perience” exception was invalid on due process grounds, the court explained, 
because “the amount of damage is an essential element of the crime of felony 
criminal mischief.”66  In so ruling, the court disapproved Jackson v. State,67 a 
Second District case interpreting the theft statute to permit a petty theft con-
viction when, in the absence of proof of value, no reasonable person could 
doubt that the value of the stolen property exceeded one hundred dollars.68  
The court held that Jackson had misinterpreted the theft statute, which per-
mits a jury to determine a minimum value only if it is impossible to ascertain 
the value of the stolen items.69  However, the jury may not do so if the state 
fails to prove the value of property that is capable of valuation.70  Finally, the 
court observed, “application of a ‘life experience’ exception to any criminal 
statute, including the criminal theft statute, is inconsistent with the uniform 
system of justice that both the Florida and Federal Constitutions require and 
should not be left to the whim of individual jury members.”71 
C. Homicide 
1. Felony Murder 
a. Merger Doctrine 
In State v. Sturdivant,72 the Supreme Court of Florida receded from its 
decision in Brooks v. State73 and held “that the merger doctrine does not 
preclude . . . conviction” for felony murder when death is caused by “a single 
  
 65. Marrero II, 71 So. 3d at 891. 
 66. Id. at 887, 889. 
 67. 413 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
 68. Marrero II, 71 So. 3d at 888–89 (citing Jackson, 413 So. 2d at 112); see FLA. STAT. § 
812.012(10)(b) (2012). 
 69. Marrero II, 71 So. 3d at 888–89 (citing Jackson, 413 So. 2d at 112); see FLA. STAT. § 
812.012(10)(b). 
 70. Marrero II, 71 So. 3d at 889 (citing Jackson, 413 So. 2d at 112). 
 71. Id.; see also Colletti v. State, 74 So. 3d 497, 498, 500 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 
(citing Marrero II, 71 So. 3d at 891) (reversing the defendant’s felony murder conviction, 
which was based on the underlying felony of grand theft, because the State failed to present 
any evidence showing the value of the items taken from the victim’s home). 
 72. 94 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2012). 
 73. 918 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam), abrogated in part by State v. Sturdivant, 94 
So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2012). 
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act of aggravated child abuse.”74  Sturdivant was convicted of both first-
degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse because he struck his two-
year old victim on the head so forcefully that the child fell and hit his head 
on a concrete wall.75  The First District reversed and certified the following 
question:  “Whether Brooks precludes a conviction for felony murder based 
on the predicate offense of aggravated child abuse when the abuse consists of 
a single act, despite the language of section 782.04(1)(a)2., the felony-
murder statute.”76 
The court began by examining the merger doctrine as a doctrine of sta-
tutory construction distinct from the constitutional principle of double jeo-
pardy.77  Consequently, the analysis centered on the plain language of the 
statute, which expressly permits a felony murder conviction to be predicated 
upon “‘any . . . [a]ggravated child abuse.’”78  Thus, the court concluded that 
the legislature’s unambiguous intent is to preclude merger of an enumerated 
felony into a homicide conviction and to increase punishment when a child’s 
death “is caused by even a single act of aggravated child abuse.”79 
The court then reviewed its decision in Brooks, which held that where a 
child was killed by a single act of stabbing, the abusive act merged with the 
homicide because both crimes involved the same conduct.80  The court con-
cluded that Brooks was incorrectly decided on two levels.81  First, the deci-
sion “was contrary to the plain language of the statute and legislative intent” 
because it “created a distinction not contemplated by the Legislature—
whether the underlying felony of aggravated child abuse consists of a single 
act or multiple acts.”82  Second, the decision “improperly extended and relied 
upon”83 Mills v. State,84 where the court held that an aggravated battery con-
viction merged with a homicide conviction because both were based on a 
  
 74. Compare Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 442, with Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 198 (holding that 
the underlying felony of aggravated child abuse could not serve as the predicate felony crime 
in a first-degree felony murder charge if only a single act led to the child’s death because in 
that situation the felony would merge into the homicide). 
 75. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 436. 
 76. Id. at 437 (citing FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2. (2012)). 
 77. Id. at 437 n.3. 
 78. Id. at 440 (alteration in original) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2.h.). 
 79. Id.; see also § 782.04(1)(a)2.h. 
 80. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 440–42 (citing Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 198 (Fla. 
2005) (per curiam), abrogated in part by State v. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2012)). 
 81. Id. at 441 (citing Dorsey v. State, 868 So. 2d 1192, 1199 (Fla. 2003); Mills v. State, 
476 So. 2d 172, 177 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam)); see also Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 198. 
 82. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 441; see also Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 217 (Lewis, J., dissent-
ing). 
 83. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 441. 
 84. 476 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam). 
9
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single gunshot blast.85  Mills was inapposite, the court explained, because the 
underlying crime in that case was an unenumerated felony.86  The felony 
murder statute has been amended since Mills87 to include aggravated child 
abuse as an enumerated predicate felony.88  Accordingly, the court quashed 
the decision of the First District, receded from Brooks, and held that “the 
merger doctrine does not preclude a felony-murder conviction predicated 
upon a single act of aggravated child abuse that caused the child’s death 
since aggravated child abuse is an enumerated underlying offense in the fe-
lony murder statute.”89 
In Williams v. State,90 the First District reversed a conviction for at-
tempted felony murder based on the felony merger doctrine and endeavored 
to explain the difference between a “standard double jeopardy analysis and 
the principle of merger.”91  The defendant in this case was convicted, inter 
alia, of attempted premeditated first-degree murder and attempted felony 
murder after he fired multiple shots at his fleeing victim.92  In support of his 
argument that his convictions violated the principle against double jeopardy, 
he cited case law addressing the merger principle.93  The court rejected the 
double jeopardy claim because the design to kill element that is required for 
attempted premeditated first-degree murder is not required for attempted 
felony murder, and no exception in the double jeopardy statute applied.94  
However, the merger principle “is an exception to the standard double jeo-
pardy analysis,” the court wrote.95  Because the defendant’s “pursuit of the 
victim constituted one criminal act or one attempted murder,” the dual con-
victions were impermissible.96  In other words, unless each attempted murder 
conviction is based on “a separate criminal episode or distinct acts,” multiple 
punishments for the same attempted killing of the same victim violate the 
  
 85. Id. at 177; see also Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 442 (citing Mills, 476 So. 2d at 177). 
 86. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 442 (citing Mills, 476 So. 2d at 177). 
 87. Mills, 476 So. 2d at 177.  Although Mills was decided in 1985, the court relied on the 
1979 statute.  Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a) (1979), amended by FLA. STAT. § 
782.04(1)(a)2.h. (Supp. 1984). 
 88. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2.h. (2012). 
 89. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 442. 
 90. 90 So. 3d 931 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 91. Id. at 932–33. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 934 (citing Smith v. State, 973 So. 2d 1209, 1210–11 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2008); Jackson v. State, 868 So. 2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)). 
 94. Id.; see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (citing Gavieres 
v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)). 
 95. Williams, 90 So. 3d at 934. 
 96. Id. at 935. 
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merger principle.97  Accordingly, the court affirmed Williams’ conviction for 
attempted premeditated first-degree murder and reversed his conviction for 
attempted felony murder.98 
b. Underlying Felony 
In Hernandez v. State (Hernandez II),99 the Supreme Court of Florida 
reversed a defendant’s first-degree felony murder convictions on the ground 
that the evidence failed to establish the predicate crime of trafficking or at-
tempted trafficking in cocaine.100  In this case, the State charged Hernandez 
with two counts of first-degree felony murder, alleging that the victims were 
killed while he was engaged in the underlying felony of trafficking or at-
tempting to traffic in cocaine.101  The Third District affirmed, holding that the 
evidence was sufficient evidence for a jury to infer that the parties contem-
plated a sale of twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine.102  The Supreme 
Court of Florida granted discretionary review based on conflict with Wil-
liams v. State,103 where the First District overturned a conviction for conspir-
acy to traffic in twenty-eight or more grams of cocaine because “‘no specific 
amounts were discussed on the two occasions when appellant was present, 
nor did appellant agree to furnish a specific amount of cocaine.’”104  This, 
then, was the context for the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in 
Hernandez.105 
The court decided that, as in Williams, the evidence was insufficient to 
establish the predicate crime.106  Testimony that Hernandez intended to sell 
10,000 grams of counterfeit cocaine was unhelpful in establishing his intent 
  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. 56 So. 3d 752 (Fla. 2010). 
 100. Id. at 758; see FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2.a. (2012) (stating that an unlawful killing 
committed “in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, [a] [t]rafficking offense 
prohibited by s[ection] 893.135(1)” is first-degree murder); see also FLA. STAT. § 
893.135(1)(b)1.; Williams v. State, 592 So. 2d 737, 739 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
 101. Hernandez II, 56 So. 3d at 754; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04(1)(a)2.a., 
893.135(1)(b)1. 
 102. Hernandez v. State (Hernandez I), 994 So. 2d 488, 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), 
review granted, 15 So. 3d 590 (Fla. 2009), and rev’d, 56 So. 3d 580 (Fla. 2010); see also FLA. 
STAT. § 893.135(1)(b)1.a. 
 103. 592 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
 104. Hernandez II, 56 So. 3d at 754, 758 (quoting Williams, 592 So. 2d at 739); see also 
Hernandez I, 994 So. 2d at 490. 
 105. Hernandez II, 56 So. 3d at 754, 757–58. 
 106. Id. at 762. 
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to traffic in actual cocaine, the court explained.107  The inference that Her-
nandez believed that the transaction was going to be for $30,000 was also 
insufficient.108  There was no evidence of the value of the cocaine, the court 
stated, adding that the price of this drug is not “sufficiently known to the 
public at large that a jury can be left to infer on its own that a dollar value 
alone proves that a trafficking quantity of cocaine was involved.”109  Finally, 
Hernandez’s statement that the seller arrived at the transaction with a large 
box was likewise insufficient because no evidence showed that drugs were in 
the box or that Hernandez even believed the box contained $30,000 worth of 
cocaine.110  However, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to 
convict Hernandez of an “attempt[] to engage in a transaction involving an 
unspecified quantity of cocaine,” which is a predicate felony for third-degree 
felony murder.111  Accordingly, the court vacated his first-degree felony 
murder convictions and directed entry of judgment for third-degree felony 
murder.112 
2. Second-Degree Depraved Mind Murder 
In Black v. State,113 the issue before the Second District was whether ex-
treme recklessness alone is legally sufficient to establish the actual malice 
element of second-degree murder.114  In this case, Black told a friend that he 
wanted to commit suicide and “intended to make big headlines and go out 
with a bang.”115  He then drove into a parking lot and accelerated directly 
into a group of people.116  After driving away from his first victim, Black 
crossed into oncoming traffic and drove toward a pregnant pedestrian, killing 
her and her unborn child.117  A jury convicted the defendant, inter alia, of 
two counts of second-degree murder and one count of attempted second-
degree murder.118  On appeal, he argued that extreme recklessness alone is 
legally insufficient to establish the actual malice element of second-degree 
  
 107. Id. at 760–61 (citing Hernandez I, 994 So. 2d at 490). 
 108. Id. at 761–62. 
 109. Id. at 762. 
 110. Hernandez II, 56 So. 3d at 761. 
 111. Id. at 763–64 (citing Ross v. State, 528 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 
1988)); see also FLA. STAT. § 782.04(4) (2012). 
 112. Hernandez II, 56 So. 3d at 754, 764. 
 113. 37 Fla. L. Weekly D593 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2012). 
 114. Id. at D594. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Black, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D593. 
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murder.119  The court disagreed and distinguished the decisional law on 
which Black relied.120  In those cases, the court wrote, the reckless driving 
was motivated by a desire to elude arrest, and each driver either “failed to see 
the victims until it was too late . . . or lost control over his vehicle.”121  No 
evidence established that those defendants acted with malice toward their 
victims.122  In contrast, because Black drove directly into his victims, the jury 
could reasonably infer that he was trying to carry out his threat.123  The court 
affirmed Black’s convictions, writing that a plan such as that one demon-
strated the requisite malice for second-degree murder.124 
3. Manslaughter 
a. Manslaughter by Act 
During the survey period, the Florida courts continued to struggle with 
the jury instructions for manslaughter and attempted manslaughter.125  In 
2010, in State v. Montgomery (Montgomery II),126 the Supreme Court of 
Florida held that where the defendant was charged with second-degree mur-
der, it was fundamentally erroneous127 to give the 2006 standard jury instruc-
tion for manslaughter by act because that instruction incorrectly required the 
jury to find that the defendant intended to cause the death of the victim.128  
The 2006 jury instruction that proved problematic in Montgomery II required 
  
 119. Id. at D594 (citing Hicks v. State, 41 So. 3d 327, 331 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010); 
Michelson v. State, 805 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam); Ellison v. 
State, 547 So. 2d 1003, 1006 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989), quashed in part, 561 So. 2d 576 
(Fla. 1990)). 
 120. Id. (citing Hicks, 41 So. 3d at 331; Michelson, 805 So. 2d at 985; Ellison, 547 So. 2d 
at 1006). 
 121. Id. at D595 (citing Hicks, 41 So. 3d at 331; Michelson, 805 So. 2d at 984; Ellison, 
547 So. 2d at 1006). 
 122. Id. at D594 (citing Hicks, 41 So. 3d at 331; Michelson, 805 So. 2d at 985; Ellison, 
547 So. 2d at 1006). 
 123. Black, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D594. 
 124. Id. at D594–95. 
 125. See State v. Montgomery (Montgomery II), 39 So. 3d 252, 256–57 (Fla. 2010) (citing 
FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7 (2006)); In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cas-
es–Report No. 2007-10, 997 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Taylor v. State, 
444 So. 2d 931, 934 (Fla. 1983); FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 6.6 (1994)). 
 126. 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010). 
 127. Id. at 259.  A harmless error analysis applies when the manslaughter charge is two or 
more degrees removed from the charge for which the defendant is convicted.  Id. (citing Pena 
v. State, 901 So. 2d 781, 787 (Fla. 2005)); Daugherty v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1231, 
D1231 (4th Dist. Ct. App. May 23, 2012) (citing Pena, 901 So. 2d at 787). 
 128. Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 258. 
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“the State [to] prove that the defendant intentionally caused the death of the 
victim.”129  This language was at odds with the statutory definition of man-
slaughter, which required only an intent to commit an act that was neither 
justifiable nor excusable.130  The court explained that the flawed manslaugh-
ter instruction could have led to a second-degree murder conviction if the 
jury believed that the defendant did not intentionally cause the victim’s 
death.131 
The Montgomery II court specifically limited its decision to the 2006 
instruction,132 distinguishing it from the 2008 instruction approved after 
Montgomery’s trial.133  The 2008 amendment changed the instruction to re-
quire proof that the defendant had “an intent to commit an act which caused 
death.”134  The appendix to the amendment also provided that the State is not 
required to prove premeditation when the intent-to-kill element is “alleged 
and proved, and manslaughter [was] being defined as a lesser included of-
fense of first-degree premeditated murder.”135  The court believed that this 
language was sufficient to clarify that manslaughter by act requires “the in-
tent to commit an act that caused the death of the victim.”136  Nevertheless, 
the 2008 instruction was bound to create confusion because it still required 
the State to prove that the defendant intentionally caused the victim’s 
death.137  Perhaps for this reason, the court issued an interim amended in-
struction—the 2010 instruction—on its own motion together with the release 
of its opinion in Montgomery II.138  This new instruction replaced the intent-
to-kill language with the requirement that the defendant “inten[ded] to com-
  
 129. Id. at 257 (emphasis added); FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7. (2006). 
 130. Compare FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7, with FLA. STAT. § 782.07(1) (2012). 
 131. See Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 259. 
 132. Id. at 256 (citing FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7). 
 133. Id. at 257 (quoting In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases–Report No. 
2007-10, 997 So. 2d 403, 403 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam)).  Montgomery II “does not apply 
retroactively to convictions [that] were final before” the Supreme Court of Florida issued its 
opinion in that case.  Ross v. State, 82 So. 3d 975, 976 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per 
curiam) (citing Harricharan v. State, 59 So. 3d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per 
curiam), review denied, 92 So. 3d 213 (Fla. 2012); Rozzelle v. State, 29 So. 3d 1141, 1142 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009), review denied, 92 So. 3d 214 (Fla. 2012)). 
 134. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 997 So. 2d at 403 (citing Hall v. 
State, 951 So. 2d 91, 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (en banc)). 
 135. Id. at 404 (citing FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7). 
 136. Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 257. 
 137. See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 997 So. 2d at 404 (citing 
FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7). 
 138. Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 257 n.3 (citing In re Amendments to Standard Jury 
Instructions in Criminal Cases—Instruction 7.7 (In re Amendments to Instruction 7.7 I), 41 
So. 3d 853, 853 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam), amended by 75 So. 3d 210 (Fla. 2011)). 
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mit an act that was not justified or excusable and which caused death.”139  
After receiving comments about the 2010 instruction, the court issued the 
most recent instruction—the 2011 instruction.140  This 2011 instruction pro-
vides that the State is not required “to prove that the defendant had an intent 
to cause death, only an intent to commit an act that was not merely negligent, 
justified, or excusable and which caused death.”141 
Together with these amendments, the Montgomery II decision has un-
leashed a veritable tsunami of conflicting decisions on the applicability of 
that ruling in myriad situations.142  The following discussion attempts to ca-
tegorize and synthesize those opinions. 
i. The 2008 Jury Instruction 
A conflict exists among the district courts of appeal as to whether the 
2008 instruction suffered from the same infirmities as the instruction that 
was the subject of the Montgomery II ruling.143  The first court to analyze the 
2008 instruction was the First District in Riesel v. State,144 which held that 
the amended instruction had not obviated the problems of its predecessor 
“because it, too, erroneously stated that intent-to-kill was an element of man-
slaughter.”145  The Second and Third Districts disagreed, however.146 
  
 139. In re Amendments to Instruction 7.7 I, 41 So. 3d at 855. 
 140. In re Amendments to Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Instruction 7.7 
(In re Amendments to Instruction 7.7 II), 75 So. 3d 210, 210 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam). 
 141. Id. at 212 app. (emphasis omitted). 
 142. See infra Part II.C.3.a.i. 
 143. Compare Riesel v. State, 48 So. 3d 885, 886 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per cu-
riam) (citing Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 256, 259), with Figueroa v. State, 77 So. 3d 714, 
714 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011), and Daniels v. State (Daniels I), 72 So. 3d 227, 230 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 79 So. 3d 744 (Fla. 2012); see also In re Standard Jury 
Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report No. 2007-10, 997 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 2008) (per 
curiam). 
 144. 48 So. 3d 885 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam), review denied, 66 So. 3d 
304 (Fla. 2011). 
 145. Id. at 886 (citing Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 256, 259).  The First District reaffirmed 
Riesel.  See Richards v. State, 84 So. 3d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Noack v. 
State, 61 So. 3d 1208, 1208 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Herring v. 
State, 43 So. 3d 823, 824 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam); Lamb v. State, 18 So. 3d 
734, 735 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam)); Williams v. State, 50 So. 3d 1207, 1208 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam) (discussing Riesel, 48 So. 3d at 886; Pryor v. State, 
48 So. 3d 159, 161 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review dismissed, 66 So. 3d 304 (Fla. 
2011)). 
 146. Compare Daniels I, 72 So. 3d at 230, with Figueroa, 77 So. 3d at 714, 716. 
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In Figueroa v. State,147 the Third District held that the amendment of the 
2008 instruction in 2010 did “not render the giving of the 2008 instruction 
fundamental error.”148  After all, the court wrote, the Montgomery II decision 
“clearly and unequivocally” concluded that the clarifying language in the 
2008 instruction had rectified the problems with the 2006 instruction.149  The 
Third District therefore certified conflict with the First District’s opinion in 
Riesel.150 
Similarly, in Daniels v. State (Daniels I),151 the Second District deter-
mined that the 2008 instruction did not require proof of intent-to-kill.152  
First, the court wrote, the Montgomery II decision specifically concluded that 
the clarifying language in the 2008 instruction had cured any apparent de-
fect.153  Second, the fact that the 2010 instruction retained this clarifying lan-
guage while eliminating other mention of “intentional acts or premeditated 
intent” demonstrated that the two instructions were not so “materially differ-
ent . . . [as to warrant] a finding that the 2008 . . . instruction was fundamen-
tally erroneous.”154  Thus, in Daniels I, the trial court correctly instructed the 
jury that, when trying to determine if the defendant’s actions “intentionally 
caused the death of the victim,” the jury must determine if the defendant 
“‘inten[ded] to commit an act [that] caused death.’”155  According to the ap-
pellate court, this language correctly defined the intent element of man-
slaughter.156  The Second District nevertheless certified conflict with the de-
cision of the First District in Riesel.157  The Supreme Court of Florida has 
accepted jurisdiction in Daniels v. State (Daniels II).158 
  
 147. 77 So. 3d 714 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 148. Id. at 714. 
 149. Id. at 715 (citing Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 256–57); see also Page v. State, 81 So. 
3d 525, 526 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“[I]t is difficult to believe, much less hold, that the 
[s]upreme [c]ourt would even ‘authorize’ a purportedly curative instruction which was fun-
damentally wrong.”). 
 150. Figueroa, 77 So. 3d at 715–16 (certifying conflict with Noack, 61 So. 3d at 1208, 
Pryor, 48 So. 3d at 162–63, and Riesel, 48 So. 3d at 886). 
 151. 72 So. 3d 227 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 79 So. 3d 744 (Fla. 
2012). 
 152. Id. at 230. 
 153. Id. (citing Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 257). 
 154. Id. at 232.  The Second District reaffirmed Daniels I.  Berube v. State, 84 So. 3d 436, 
436 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Black v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D593, D595 (2d Dist. Ct. 
App. Mar. 9, 2012); Pharisien v. State, 74 So. 3d 156, 157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 155. Daniels I, 72 So. 3d at 230, 232 (quoting Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 257). 
 156. Id. at 232. 
 157. Id.; see also Riesel v. State, 48 So. 3d 885, 886–87 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per 
curiam), review denied, 66 So. 3d 304 (Fla. 2011). 
 158. 79 So. 3d 744, 744 (Fla. 2012) (unpublished table decision). 
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ii. Instructing the Jury on Both Manslaughter by Act and Manslaughter by 
Culpable Negligence 
In spite of these differences, all of the Florida District Courts of Appeal 
agree that a trial court does not commit fundamental error by giving the erro-
neous manslaughter by act instruction in a second-degree murder prosecution 
if the jury is also instructed on manslaughter by culpable negligence.159  The 
reason cited is that this additional instruction affords the jury the opportunity 
to return a verdict for the lesser included offense of manslaughter by culpa-
ble negligence, which does not require intent-to-kill.160  These cases were 
therefore distinguishable from the Montgomery cases, where the absence of 
an instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence required the jury to 
return a verdict of second-degree murder upon finding no intent-to-kill.161 
If the evidence does not support a culpable negligence theory of man-
slaughter, however, a jury instruction on that crime may not cure an errone-
ous manslaughter by act instruction.162  This was the problem confronting the 
Second District in Haygood v. State (Haygood I),163 where the court felt 
bound by governing precedent to affirm a second-degree murder conviction 
after the jury was instructed on both forms of manslaughter.164  In this case, 
however, the jury was faced with a conundrum.  The manslaughter by act 
instruction was flawed, and the evidence arguably did not support “a theory 
of manslaughter by culpable negligence.”165  This meant that if the jury be-
  
 159. See, e.g., Paul v. State, 63 So. 3d 828, 830 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Guerra v. 
State, 44 So. 3d 226, 226 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Barros-Dias v. State, 41 So. 3d 370, 
372 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Singh v. State, 36 So. 3d 848, 851 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2010); Salonko v. State, 42 So. 3d 801, 802–03 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam) 
(citing Nieves v. State, 22 So. 3d 691, 692 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009)). 
 160. Jackson v. State, 49 So. 3d 271, 272 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam) 
(“[E]ven though the erroneous instruction on manslaughter by act was given, the jury in this 
case was given the option of finding manslaughter by culpable negligence.”). 
 161. Compare, e.g., Barros-Dias, 41 So. 3d at 372, with Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d 252, 
258–60 (Fla. 2010), and Montgomery v. State (Montgomery I), 70 So. 3d 603, 608 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010). 
 162. Curry v. State, 64 So. 3d 152, 156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam) (finding 
that the defendant “did not waive the fundamental error in the manslaughter by act instruction 
by requesting that the [jury] . . . not [be] instruct[ed] on manslaughter by culpable negligence 
[where] [t]he evidence arguably did not support a culpable negligence theory of manslaugh-
ter”); Pollock v. State, 64 So. 3d 695, 698 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the erro-
neous manslaughter by act instruction was not saved by a manslaughter by culpable negli-
gence instruction where the evidence did not support that theory). 
 163. 54 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.) (per curiam), review granted, 61 So. 3d 410 
(Fla. 2011). 
 164. Id. at 1036–37. 
 165. Id. at 1037. 
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lieved the defendant intended his act but not the resulting death, “then neither 
form of manslaughter provided a viable lesser offense” on which to convict 
him.166  Although the evidence supported the second-degree murder verdict, 
the court found it “impossible to speculate what the jury would have found 
had it been properly instructed that manslaughter by act does not require the 
intent-to-kill.”167  For this reason, the Second District certified the following 
question to the Supreme Court of Florida: 
If a jury returns a verdict finding a defendant guilty of second-
degree murder in a case where the evidence does not support a 
theory of culpable negligence, does a trial court commit funda-
mental error by giving a flawed manslaughter by act instruction 
when it also gives an instruction on manslaughter by culpable neg-
ligence?168 
The Supreme Court of Florida has accepted discretionary review of Haygood 
I.169 
iii. The Attempted Manslaughter by Act Instruction 
Although the manslaughter by act instruction has been amended three 
times since the trial court decision in Montgomery II,170 the corresponding 
instruction for attempted manslaughter has remained unchanged.171  This 
instruction requires the State to prove that the defendant committed an act 
that was intended to cause the victim’s death, and would have caused death, 
if the defendant had not failed or been prevented from doing so.172  A conflict 
exists among the district courts as to whether this instruction remains viable 
  
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.  But cf. Carey v. State, 84 So. 3d 404, 405–06 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per 
curiam) (finding it irrelevant that the evidence did not support a theory of manslaughter by 
culpable negligence because the term “intentional act” did not mislead jurors into thinking that 
an intent-to-kill was required). 
 168. Haygood I, 54 So. 3d at 1038; see also Pierre-Louis v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly 
D1732, D1733 (2d Dist. Ct. App. July 20, 2012); Garrido v. State, 76 So. 3d 378, 378 (Fla. 3d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam); McNealy v. State, 67 So. 3d 1187, 1188 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2011) (per curiam). 
 169. See Haygood v. State (Haygood II), 61 So. 3d 410, 410 (Fla. 2011). 
 170. See In re Amendments to Instruction 7.7 I, 41 So. 3d 853, 853, 857 (Fla. 2010) (per 
curiam), amended by 75 So. 3d 210 (Fla. 2011); Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d 252, 254 (Fla. 
2010); FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7 (2011). 
 171. See FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 6.6 (1994). 
 172. Id.  When “attempted manslaughter is . . . defined as a lesser included offense of 
attempted first-degree premeditated murder,” the jury is also instructed that the State need not 
“prove that the defendant had a premeditated intent to cause death.”  Id. 
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in light of Montgomery II.173  The debate centers on the question whether the 
instruction improperly adds an intent-to-kill element that is not an element of 
the statutory crime of attempted manslaughter by act.174 
During the last survey period, the First District decided Lamb v. State175 
and Rushing v. State,176 which held that the attempted manslaughter by act 
instruction improperly requires the jury to find that the defendant intentional-
ly attempted to kill the victim.177  The Fourth District rejected this argument 
in Williams v. State (Williams I).178  There, the court refused to extend Mont-
gomery II to the attempted manslaughter by act instruction because that 
crime “requires an intent to commit an unlawful act that would have resulted 
in the victim’s death rather than an intent-to-kill.”179  The court also con-
cluded that the instruction, as worded, did not confuse the jury because the 
defendant’s second-degree murder conviction reflected the jury’s finding that 
he intended to commit an “imminently dangerous [act evincing] a depraved 
mind.”180  The Fourth District certified conflict with Lamb and also “cer-
tif[ied] the following questions of great public importance:  (1) Does the 
standard jury instruction on attempted manslaughter constitute fundamental 
error?  (2) Is attempted manslaughter a viable offense in light of [Montgom-
ery II]?”181 
More recently, in Houston v. State,182 the Second District held that the 
attempted manslaughter instruction suffers from the same infirmity as the 
2008 manslaughter instruction in Montgomery II and constitutes fundamental 
  
 173. See, e.g., Fenster v. State, 61 So. 3d 465, 466–67 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (ap-
plying Williams v. State (Williams I), 40 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review 
granted, 64 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. 2011)); Rushing v. State, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1376, D1377 (1st 
Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2010) (citing Lamb v. State, 18 So. 3d 734, 735 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2009) (per curiam)); see also Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 254. 
 174. See FLA. STAT. §§ 777.04(1), 782.07(1) (2012); Fenster, 61 So. 3d at 466–67 (citing 
Williams I, 40 So. 3d at 74–75); Lamb, 18 So. 3d at 735. 
 175. 18 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam). 
 176. 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1376 (1st Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2010). 
 177. Id. at D1376; Lamb, 18 So. 3d at 735; see also Montgomery I, 70 So. 3d 603, 608 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010). 
 178. 40 So. 3d 72, 75–76 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review granted, 64 So. 3d 1262 
(Fla. 2011); see also Fenster, 61 So. 3d at 466–67 (agreeing with Williams I, 40 So. 3d at 75, 
that no fundamental error occurs when the jury convicts a defendant of attempted second-
degree murder after receiving the standard jury instruction for the lesser offense of attempted 
manslaughter). 
 179. Williams I, 40 So. 3d at 74–75 (citing Taylor v. State, 444 So. 2d 931, 934 (Fla. 
1983)). 
 180. Id. at 75. 
 181. Id. at 75–76.  The same questions were certified in Fenster.  Fenster, 61 So. 3d at 
467. 
 182. 87 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 73 So. 3d 760 (Fla. 2011). 
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error.183  Nothing in either the manslaughter statute184 or the attempt statute185 
“suggests that the crime of attempted manslaughter requires an intent-to-
kill,” the court wrote.186  Reversing for a new trial on the charge of attempted 
second-degree murder, the court also certified conflict with Williams I.187  
The First,188 Third,189 and Fifth190 Districts have followed Houston and certi-
fied conflict with Williams I.191 
The Supreme Court of Florida has granted review of Williams I to re-
solve this conflict,192 and Instruction 6.6 for attempted voluntary manslaugh-
ter is currently under review by the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions 
in Criminal Cases.193  The proposed instruction seeks to remove the phrase 
“intended to cause the death of [the] victim” and to add the word “intention-
  
 183. Id. at 3–4; see also Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d 252, 259–60 (Fla. 2010). 
 184. See FLA. STAT. § 782.07 (2012). 
 185. See id. § 777.04. 
 186. Houston, 87 So. 3d at 2 (citing Bass v. State, 45 So. 3d 970, 971 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2010) (per curiam); Lamb v. State, 18 So. 3d 734, 735 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per 
curiam)). 
 187. Id. at 4.  Conflict was also certified in Pierre-Louis v. State.  Pierre-Louis v. State, 37 
Fla. L. Weekly D1732, D1733 (2d Dist. Ct. App. July 20, 2012). 
 188. Moore v. State, 78 So. 3d 118, 118 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam) (“certi-
fy[ing] the following question of great public importance:  Is attempted manslaughter a viable 
offense in light of [Montgomery II]?”); Minnich v. State, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D216, D217 (1st 
Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2011) (per curiam) (“certify[ing] conflict with Williams [I], [and certi-
fying] the following questions of great public importance:  (1) Does the standard jury instruc-
tion on attempted manslaughter constitute fundamental error?  (2) Is attempted manslaughter a 
viable offense in light of [Montgomery II]?”). 
 189. Gordon v. State, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D2590, D2590 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2011); 
Burrows v. State, 62 So. 3d 1258, 1259 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (finding the attempted 
manslaughter instruction to be fundamental error and certifying conflict with Williams I). 
 190. Thomas v. State, 91 So. 3d 880, 882 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (finding the at-
tempted manslaughter instruction to be fundamental error because “the jury could reasonably 
have concluded that the offenses were presented in descending order of seriousness and that 
attempted voluntary manslaughter was less serious than aggravated battery,” and certifying 
conflict with Williams I).  But see Pavolko v. State, 78 So. 3d 86, 87–88 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2012) (per curiam) (emphasis omitted) (finding that a non-standard instruction requiring 
the state to prove that the defendant “intentionally committed an act, which would have re-
sulted in the death of [the victim] except that someone prevented [the defendant] from killing 
[the victim] or he failed to do so,” could not have been reasonably understood by the jury “as 
including an [element of] intent to cause death”). 
 191. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
 192. Williams v. State (Williams II), 64 So. 3d 1262, 1262 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 193. Alerts – Criminal Jury Instructions, FLA. SUPREME CT., 
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/alerts.shtml (last updated Oct. 7, 2011). 
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ally” before “committed an act.”194  In other words, the proposed revision 
would require the State to prove that the “[d]efendant intentionally commit-
ted an act . . . [that] would have resulted in the [victim’s] death” if the defen-
dant had not failed or been prevented from doing so.195 
iv. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
All district courts have found ineffective assistance of counsel where 
appellate counsel failed to raise the Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in 
Montgomery II while direct appeal was pending.196  The First and Fifth Dis-
tricts have held that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that 
the manslaughter instruction was fundamentally erroneous after conflict was 
certified in Montgomery v. State (Montgomery I)197 and the Supreme Court of 
Florida accepted the issue for review.198  The Second and Fifth Districts have 
found ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to argue that the 
attempted manslaughter by act instruction was fundamentally erroneous.199 
v. Conclusion 
The decisional chaos described above appears to stem from the failure 
of these opinions, including Montgomery II, to recognize that Florida’s man-
slaughter by act statute is a codification of two forms of common law man-
slaughter requiring different mental states.200  Thus, manslaughter by act is 
involuntary when the defendant intends to commit an unlawful act that re-
  
 194. Proposed Amendments to the Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, FLA B. NEWS, Feb. 
15, 2011, http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01.nsf/Articles/CEC66F4B11B443 
8285257830004DB637. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Bonilla v. State, 87 So. 3d 1222, 1222–23 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per 
curiam); Cooper v. State, 83 So. 3d 998, 999 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam); 
Ferrer v. State, 69 So. 3d 360, 361–62 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Hartley v. State, 65 So. 
3d 584, 584–85 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam); Hodges v. State, 64 So. 3d 142, 
142–43 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam), mandamus denied, 88 So. 3d 149 (Fla. 
2012). 
 197. 70 So. 3d 603 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010). 
 198. Lopez v. State, 68 So. 3d 332, 333, 335 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Asberry v. 
State, 32 So. 3d 718, 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam). 
 199. See McClendon v. State, 93 So. 3d 1131, 1131–32 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); 
Mendenhall v. State, 82 So. 3d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam) (citing 
Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d 252, 256–58 (Fla. 2010)). 
 200. Compare Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 256, with Fortner v. State, 161 So. 94, 96 (Fla. 
1935) (Brown, J., concurring). 
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sults in death, although with no intent-to-kill.201  In such cases, Montgomery 
II correctly holds that fundamental error occurs when the trial court instructs 
a jury that intent-to-kill is an element of manslaughter by act.202  Manslaugh-
ter by act is voluntary, on the other hand, when the defendant intends to kill 
“another in a sudden heat of passion due to adequate provocation, and not 
with malice.”203  In Taylor v. State,204 the Supreme Court of Florida explained 
that nothing in the statutory definition of manslaughter excludes all inten-
tional killings and provided heat of passion killings as an example of an in-
tentional killing that constitutes manslaughter.205  The Taylor court extended 
this reasoning to conclude that the crime of attempted manslaughter would 
include “situations where, if death had resulted, the defendant could have 
been found guilty of voluntary manslaughter.”206 
Arguably, by removing the intent-to-kill element from the jury instruc-
tion, the Supreme Court of Florida has eliminated the crime of voluntary 
manslaughter and possibly attempted voluntary manslaughter as well.207  
Separate jury instructions for voluntary manslaughter and involuntary man-
slaughter could eliminate the seemingly endless interpretive problems de-
scribed in this section.208 
b. Manslaughter by Culpable Negligence 
Santarelli v. State209 was the first manslaughter case to be decided under 
Florida’s Open House Party statute,210 which prohibits a person in charge of a 
  
 201. Hall v. State, 951 So. 2d 91, 95–96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (en banc). 
 202. Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 258.  Courts recognize a “narrow exception” when the 
erroneous manslaughter by act instruction is accompanied by the manslaughter by culpable 
negligence instruction because the latter option permits the jury to return a manslaughter ver-
dict without finding an intent-to-kill.  See Sullivan v. State, 50 So. 3d 33, 34 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2010) (citing Joyner v. State, 41 So. 3d 306, 306–07 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010)), 
review denied, 67 So. 3d 1050 (Fla. 2011). 
 203. Fortner, 161 So. at 96 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 204. 444 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1983). 
 205. See id. at 933 (quoting Williams v. State, 26 So. 184, 186 (Fla. 1899)). 
 206. See id. at 934 (citing Anthony v. State, 409 N.E.2d 632, 636 (Ind. 1980); Common-
wealth v. Hebert, 368 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Mass. 1977); People v. Genes, 227 N.W.2d 241, 
242–43 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237, 240 (Utah 1978)). 
 207. See id. at 934; Fortner, 161 So. at 96 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 208. See, e.g., 11TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 46.1 (2010) (voluntary manslaugh-
ter “is the unlawful and intentional killing of a human being without malice upon a sudden 
quarrel or heat of passion”); 11TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 46.2 (involuntary man-
slaughter “is the unlawful but unintentional killing of a human being [that occurs] while 
committing an unlawful act that isn’t a felony [or] as a result of an act done in wanton and 
reckless disregard for human life”). 
 209. 62 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 77 So. 3d 1255 (Fla. 2011). 
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house from allowing minors to consume intoxicants on the premises.211  In 
this case, two teenagers were killed in a drunk driving incident after leaving 
a house party, hosted by Santarelli, at which minors were permitted to con-
sume alcohol and other illegal substances.”212  After the trial court denied her 
motion to dismiss the manslaughter counts, Santarelli was acquitted of man-
slaughter and convicted of two misdemeanor “count[s] of allowing an open 
house party . . . and . . . of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.”213  On 
appeal, she argued that “the judgments and sentences . . . on the misdemea-
nor counts [were] void” because the circuit court would have lost jurisdiction 
over these counts if the two felony manslaughter counts had been properly 
dismissed.214 
The Fifth District disagreed and affirmed her convictions.215  In her first 
argument, Santarelli asserted that the driver’s decision to operate a motor 
vehicle while intoxicated and the passenger’s decision to ride with him con-
stituted superseding events that broke the causation link necessary for the 
manslaughter charges.216  The court rejected this argument, concluding that 
the defendant’s permissive acts had triggered a chain of foreseeable events 
that led to the deaths.217  In her second argument, Santarelli maintained that a 
violation of the Open House Party statute “[could not] legally constitute 
culpable negligence” because it “is not sufficiently willful or wanton to sup-
port an award of punitive damages” and so could not support felony subject 
matter jurisdiction.218  The court rejected this argument because the defen-
dant relied on a case that predated the Open House Party statute and because 
her other “intentional and culpably negligent acts” were sufficient to support 
the manslaughter charges.219  Thus, the Fifth District held that the trial court 
properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss two counts of manslaugh-
ter.220 
  
 210. See id. at 1213, 1215; see also FLA. STAT. § 856.015 (2012). 
 211. FLA. STAT. § 856.015(2). 
 212. Santarelli, 62 So. 3d at 1212. 
 213. Id. at 1212–13. 
 214. Id. at 1212. 
 215. Id. at 1212, 1215. 
 216. Id. at 1213. 
 217. Santarelli, 62 So. 3d at 1214–15 (citing Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 835 A.2d 
801, 808 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)). 
 218. See id. at 1212–13, 1215 (citing Jacmar Pac. Pizza Corp. v. Huston, 502 So. 2d 91, 92 
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT. § 856.015 (2012)). 
 219. Id. at 1215 (citing Huston, 502 So. 2d at 92). 
 220. Id. 
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D. Kidnapping 
During the survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida wrote two opi-
nions interpreting the state kidnapping statute.221  In Davila v. State (Davila 
II),222 the court held that a custodial parent may be convicted of kidnapping 
his or her own minor child.223  The defendant in this case was convicted of 
three counts of kidnapping his eleven-year-old son based on the child’s leng-
thy confinement in various rooms in the family home on multiple occa-
sions.224  The Third District affirmed the convictions.225  The court recog-
nized a general rule barring conviction for parental kidnapping when no 
court order deprives the defendant of custody.226  However, a judicial excep-
tion exists when the defendant “‘does not simply exercise his rights to the 
child, but takes her for an ulterior and unlawful purpose which is specifically 
forbidden by the kidnapping statute itself.’”227  The court certified conflict 
with Muniz v. State,228 in which the Second District held that it is legally im-
possible for a custodial parent to kidnap his or her own child.229 
Affirming Davila’s conviction, the Supreme Court of Florida resolved 
the conflict by disapproving of Muniz.230  The court declared that no lan-
guage in Florida’s kidnapping statute precludes criminal liability when a 
custodial parent consents to the child’s confinement.231  Under section 
787.01(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes, kidnapping occurs when the defendant 
“confines, abducts, or imprisons another person, against [that person’s] will,” 
with the intent (in relevant part) to harm or terrorize that person.232  Under 
section 787.01(1)(b), if the victim is under the age of thirteen, the absence of 
parental consent to the confinement establishes that the act is against the 
child’s will.233  The court rejected the argument that this language means a 
  
 221. Davila v. State (Davila II), 75 So. 3d 192, 195 (Fla. 2011); Delgado v. State (Delgado 
II), 71 So. 3d 54, 56 (Fla. 2011). 
 222. 75 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2011). 
 223. Id. at 193, 197. 
 224. Id. at 192–94. 
 225. Davila v. State (Davila I), 26 So. 3d 5, 6 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009), review 
granted, 75 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2010), and aff’d, 75 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2011). 
 226. Id. at 7 (citing Johnson v. State, 637 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (per 
curiam)). 
 227. Id. (quoting Lafleur v. State, 661 So. 2d 346, 349 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)). 
 228. 764 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
 229. Davila I, 26 So. 3d at 7 (citing Muniz, 764 So. 2d at 731). 
 230. See Davila II, 75 So. 3d 192, 197 (Fla. 2011) (citing Muniz, 764 So. 2d at 729). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 196; see also FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(a) (2012). 
 233. Davila II, 75 So. 3d at 197; see also FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(b). 
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parent who confines a child necessarily consents to that confinement.234  In-
stead, the section simply provides “a method of proof which allows the State 
to establish that the overt act on the part of the defendant was against a per-
son’s will when that person is a child under the age of thirteen.”235  The court 
concluded that “if the Legislature intended to exempt a [custodial] parent 
from [such] criminal liability . . . it would have expressly stated so.”236 
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Charles T. Canady argued that, 
when the victim is under the age of thirteen, the absence of parental consent 
is a necessary condition for establishing that “confinement is ‘against the 
[child’s] will.’”237  In other words, the statute could be read to “exempt cus-
todial parents from criminal liability for kidnapping their own children who 
are under thirteen.”238  Justice Barbara J. Pariente added a concurring opinion 
in which she wrote that the dissent’s reasoning would lead to the absurd re-
sult that, “the parent . . . could be convicted of kidnapping a child who is 
thirteen years of age or older, but not a child under the age of thirteen.”239  
She also cautioned that section 787.01(1)(b) “was not intended to operate to 
preclude criminal liability for parents or legal guardians who meet the ele-
ments of the statute.”240 
The second case was Delgado v. State (Delgado II),241 in which the 
court held that a defendant cannot be convicted of kidnapping with the intent 
to commit or facilitate another felony unless he or she is “aware of the vic-
tim’s presence” at the time the victim is constrained.242  Here, Delgado and 
an accomplice stole a pickup truck with a sleeping toddler in the backseat, 
only to abandon the vehicle three miles away with the child frightened but 
unhurt.243  Based on these acts, he was convicted of, inter alia, “kidnapping 
with the intent to commit or facilitate a felony.”244  The Third District upheld 
the conviction on the ground that the three-part test set out in Faison v. 
  
 234. Davila II, 75 So. 3d at 197. 
 235. Id. at 196; see also FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(b). 
 236. Davila II, 75 So. 3d at 196. 
 237. Id. at 199 (Canady, C.J., dissenting); see also FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(b). 
 238. Davila II, 75 So. 3d at 199. 
 239. Id. at 197 (Pariente, J., concurring) (citing Davila II, 75 So. 3d at 199 (Canady, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
 240. Id. 
 241. 71 So. 3d 54 (Fla. 2011). 
 242. Id. at 61. 
 243. Id. at 57 & n.2. 
 244. Id. at 58. 
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State245 was satisfied when the defendant became aware of the child’s pres-
ence in the truck and continued to confine her.246   
Under the Faison test, in order for a defendant’s actions during the 
commission of another felony to constitute kidnapping, the movement or 
confinement: 
“(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential, and merely incidental to 
the other crime; 
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other 
crime; and 
(c) Must have some significance.independent of the other crime in 
that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or 
substantially lessens the risk of detection.”247   
According to the Third District in Delgado v. State (Delgado I),248 the “con-
tinued confinement of the child” constituted kidnapping under Faison be-
cause it was not incidental to the theft, but rather “was essential to Delgado’s 
attempt to avoid apprehension for [grand] theft.”249 
The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed, however, writing that the Fai-
son test was not intended to replace the elements of the kidnapping statute.250  
Because the purpose of the test is to prevent kidnapping convictions for 
crimes such as sexual battery and robbery that inherently involve unlawful 
confinement, the court ruled that all elements of a kidnapping charge must be 
proved before applying Faison.251  In this case, the State was required to 
prove that Delgado performed an overt act with the “specific intent to com-
mit or facilitate the commission of an underlying felony.”252  Without ad-
vance knowledge of the victim’s confinement, he could not have constrained 
the victim with that specific intent, and so Faison was inapplicable.253  Be-
cause the State’s evidence was insufficient to sustain the kidnapping convic-
  
 245. 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983). 
 246. See Delgado v. State (Delgado I), 19 So. 3d 1055, 1057–58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 
2009) (citing Faison, 426 So. 2d at 965), review granted, 32 So. 3d 622 (Fla. 2010), and 
quashed, 71 So. 3d 54 (Fla. 2011). 
 247. Faison, 426 So. 2d at 965 (quoting State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720, 731 (Kan. 1976)). 
 248. 19 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009), review granted, 32 So. 3d 622 (Fla. 
2010), and quashed, 71 So. 3d 54 (Fla. 2011). 
 249. Id. at 1057–58. 
 250. Delgado II, 71 So. 3d 54, 56, 60 (Fla. 2011). 
 251. Id. at 60. 
 252. Id. at 61. 
 253. Id. at 63–64, 68; see also FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(a)2. (2012). 
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tion, the court remanded the case with instructions to vacate Delgado’s kid-
napping conviction.254 
E. Sexual Offenses 
During the survey period, the Second District decided two child porno-
graphy cases in which the faces of children were superimposed upon the 
nude bodies of adults to form composite images.255  In Stelmack v. State,256 
the defendant was convicted under section 827.071(5) of the Florida Statutes 
for possessing composite images in which the faces and heads of two young 
girls were cut and pasted onto images of a woman exhibiting her genitals.257  
On appeal, Stelmack maintained that the images did not violate the child 
pornography statute as a matter of law because the nude bodies depicted in 
the composites were those of an adult.258  The Second District agreed, con-
cluding that the images depicted no more than “a simulated lewd exhibition 
of the genitals by a child,” which the statute does not proscribe.259  In other 
words, the child pornography provision requires “actual lewd exhibition of 
the genitals by a child.”260  This conclusion is supported by the legislative 
history of the statute, which “was aimed at preventing the exploitation of 
children in sexual performances.”261  Because “no part of any of the images 
displays a child who is actually lewdly exhibiting her genitals,” the appellate 
court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for the trial court to 
discharge the defendant.262 
The same court extended this decision in Parker v. State,263 where the 
composite images showed “a child’s head superimposed on an adult female 
body” involved in various forms of sexual activity.264  Regardless of whether 
the images depicted actual or simulated conduct, the court held they were not 
child pornography because no child had engaged in the conduct shown in the 
images.265  The dissent distinguished the simulated lewd exhibition of child-
  
 254. Delgado II, 71 So. 3d at 67–68. 
 255. Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451, 452 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Stelmack v. State, 
58 So. 3d 874, 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 256. 58 So. 3d 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 257. Id. at 874. 
 258. Id. at 875. 
 259. Id. at 876; see also FLA. STAT. § 827.071(1)(g) (2007) (amended 2011). 
 260. Stelmack, 58 So. 3d at 876 (first emphasis added). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 877. 
 263. 81 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 264. Id. at 453. 
 265. Id. 
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ren’s genitalia in Stelmack from the simulated sexual activity by a child in 
the instant case.266  The former was not a criminal act, according to the dis-
sent, while the latter constituted prohibited sexual activity.267  The majority 
refuted this distinction on the ground that, no matter how the images were 
characterized, the conduct was “that of an adult.”268  Consequently, Parker’s 
convictions were reversed.269 
In L.A.P. v. State,270 the Second District held that : a defendant who 
failed to advise her partner of her human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
positive status before participating in oral sex and digital vaginal penetration 
did not violate section 384.24(2) of the Florida Statutes.271  That section 
makes it unlawful for an individual knowingly infected with HIV to engage 
in sexual intercourse without both informing a partner that he or she risks 
contracting HIV and obtaining the partner’s consent.272  Because section 
384.24(2) does not define “sexual intercourse,”273 the court considered other 
statutory274 and decisional law275 and defined this term as “‘the penetration of 
the female sex organ by the male sex organ.’”276  Accordingly, the court 
agreed with the defendant “that sexual intercourse is an unambiguous phrase 
which must be given its plain meaning in the absence of a definition in chap-
ter 384” and which does not include oral and digital penetration.277  The 
Second District reversed and remanded with directions that the trial court 
discharge the defendant.278 
F. Theft 
In Sanders v. State,279 the Fourth District considered the limits of Flori-
da’s jurisdiction over a defendant whose” offense occurred “on a commercial 
  
 266. Id. at 458 (Morris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Stelmack, 58 
So. 3d at 877). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Parker, 81 So. 3d at 453 (majority opinion). 
 269. Id. at 457. 
 270. 62 So. 3d 693 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 271. Id. at 694–95; see also FLA. STAT. § 384.24(2) (2012). 
 272. FLA. STAT. § 384.24(2). 
 273. L.A.P., 62 So. 3d at 694; see also FLA. STAT. § 384.24(2). 
 274. L.A.P., 62 So. 3d at 694; see also FLA. STAT. § 826.04. 
 275. L.A.P., 62 So. 3d at 694–95 (quoting Green v. State, 765 So. 2d 910, 913 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2000)). 
 276. Id. at 694 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 826.04). 
 277. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 384.24(2). 
 278. L.A.P., 62 So. 3d at 695. 
 279. 77 So. 3d 914 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
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flight from Arizona before it entered Florida airspace.280  The State alleged 
that, before the flight landed in Fort Lauderdale, Sanders stole $500 from 
another passenger’s handbag but was forced to return the money when a 
flight attendant interceded.281  The plane was not in Florida’s airspace when 
the theft or recovery of the stolen funds occurred.282  Sanders was charged 
with grand theft.283 
Sanders moved to dismiss on the ground that, pursuant to section 
910.005 of the Florida Statutes, Florida lacked jurisdiction to prosecute be-
cause all acts relating to the charge transpired outside the state.284  The State 
argued that her conduct amounted to an attempt to commit grand theft within 
the state because, in order to complete the crime, she would have had to dep-
lane with the victim’s money after landing in Florida.285  After the trial court 
denied her motion to dismiss, Sanders pled no contest and reserved her right 
to appeal.286  The Fourth District reversed.287  The court first noted that the 
crime of theft includes “both the completed offense and the attempt[ed] . . . 
offense.”288  By the time the flight had entered Florida airspace, the court 
wrote, all elements of theft were complete because Sanders had “obtained the 
victim’s property with the intent to permanently deprive her of it.”289  “This 
means that the theft was not ‘committed . . . within’ Florida” under section 
910.005(1)(a).290  It also meant that her actions on the plane did not amount 
to an attempt to commit theft within Florida under section 910.005(1)(b).291  
The case was remanded with instructions for the trial court to grant the mo-
tion to dismiss.292 
  
 280. Id. at 914–15. 
 281. Id. at 915. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Sanders, 77 So. 3d at 915; see also FLA. STAT, § 910.005 (2012). 
 285. Sanders, 77 So. 3d at 915. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 917. 
 288. Id. at 915 (citing FLA. STAT. § 812.014(1)(a) (2012)).  Section 812.04(1)(a) of the 
Florida Statutes includes the “endeavor[] to obtain or to use the property of another with 
intent to, either temporarily or permanently deprive the other person of a right to the property 
or a benefit from the property.”  Id. at 915 (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 
812.014(1)(a)). 
 289. Sanders, 77 So. 3d at 916. 
 290. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 910.005(1)(a)). 
 291. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 910.005(1)(b)). 
 292. Id. at 917. 
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During the survey period, the courts continued to have difficulty apply-
ing section 812.025 of the Florida Statutes.293  That section permits “the 
State to charge [both] theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with 
one scheme or course of conduct,” but allows the trier of fact to return a 
guilty verdict on only one offense.294  The problem in the district courts cen-
ters on the proper remedy to apply when dual convictions result from a trial 
court’s unchallenged failure to instruct the jury that it may not convict on 
both offenses. 
In Kiss v. State,295 for example, the Fourth District concluded that the 
failure to instruct the jury on its obligation under section 812.025 required a 
new trial because merely striking the grand theft charge could not cure the 
error.296  The court reasoned that a properly instructed jury could have found 
the defendant guilty of only theft, the lesser offense.297  In Blackmon v. 
State,298 on the other hand, the First District held that the proper remedy is to 
vacate the conviction for the lesser offense.299  “[T]his remedy better respects 
the jury’s determination that the state met its burden to prove the greater of-
fense and also avoids the need to speculate what verdict the jury might have 
returned had it been required to choose between the greater and lesser of-
fenses,” the court wrote.300  Additionally, it comports with the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Florida in Hall v. State,301 where the case was remanded 
with directions to reverse one count and to resentence the defendant on the 
remaining count.302  The Blackmon court “certif[ied] conflict with Kiss re-
garding the proper remedy when, contrary to section 812.025, the defendant 
is convicted of both theft and dealing in stolen property.”303 
The Second District arrived at the same conclusion in Williams v. 
State,304 where the trial court failed to instruct the jury on section 812.025 
and then dismissed the third-degree grand theft charge when the jury con-
  
 293. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 826 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); Kiss v. State, 42 
So. 3d 810, 811 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 294. Hall, 826 So. 2d at 271 (recognizing that under this statute, the trier of fact must first 
determine the “defendant's intended use of the stolen property” and then may convict the 
defendant “of one or the other offense, but not both”). 
 295. 42 So. 3d 810 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 296. Id. at 811; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.025. 
 297. See Kiss, 42 So. 3d at 812–13. 
 298. 58 So. 3d 343 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 67 So. 3d 198 (Fla. 2011). 
 299. Id. at 348. 
 300. Id. 
 301. 826 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam). 
 302. Id. at 272. 
 303. Blackmon, 58 So. 3d at 348; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.025 (2012). 
 304. 66 So. 3d 360 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 70 So. 3d 588 (Fla. 2011). 
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victed the defendant on both counts.305  The appellate court determined that 
no new trial was warranted306 and that pursuant to the policy of double jeo-
pardy, the defendant could be sentenced based on the greater offense.307  
However, the court also criticized section 812.025 for its legislative policy 
and its lack of guidance for juries.308  Finally, the court expressed doubt as to 
whether any jury instruction was required at all, as further instruction might 
unnecessarily complicate an already confusing process.309  The court con-
cluded as follows: 
[T]he procedural requirements in section 812.025 are unenforcea-
ble to the extent that the statute (1) attempts to establish a proce-
dure by which a jury does not return a factual finding announcing 
a verdict of guilty on each of the two separately charged offenses 
despite its determination that the State has proven the offenses 
beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) requires the jury to make this 
selection without any legal criteria or factual basis.310 
Affirming the trial court’s decision, the Second District certified the follow-
ing questions of great public importance: 
1. Must the trial court instruct the jury to perform the selection 
process described in section 812.025 of the Florida Statutes? 
2. If so, must the appellate court order a new trial on both offenses 
if the trial court fails to give the instruction? 
3. If the appellate court is not required to mandate a new trial, must 
it require the trial court to select the greater offense or the lesser 
offense when the two offenses are offenses of different degrees or 
of different severity ranking? 311 
  
 305. Id. at 361; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.025; Wilkins v. State, 78 So. 3d 18, 19 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (certifying conflict with Kiss v. State, 42 So. 3d 810, 812 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2010)). 
 306. Williams, 66 So. 3d at 365. 
 307. See id. 
 308. Id. at 363; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.025. 
 309. See Williams, 66 So. 3d at 364. 
 310. Id. at 361. 
 311. Id. at 365 (emphasis added).  The Second District again certified these three questions 
in Poole v. State, 67 So. 3d 431, 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam). 
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In Kablitz v. State,312 the Fourth District reaffirmed the approach it took 
in Kiss and certified conflict with Blackmon and Williams.313 
G. Trespass 
Trespass on school grounds is a first-degree misdemeanor when the de-
fendant enters or remains there after being directed to leave the premises by 
the principal of the school or the principal’s designee.314  A designee is “one 
who has received express or implied authorization from the school’s princip-
al to exercise control over the property of the school.”315 
In D.J. v. State (D.J. I),316 the defendant “was found to have trespassed 
on school property” after being warned by a school security guard not to 
enter school property.317  On appeal, D.J. argued that the case should have 
been dismissed because the State produced no evidence that the security 
guard was a designee of the principal, as required by section 810.097(2).318  
The Third District rejected this argument, holding that the state is not re-
quired to prove the identity of the person issuing the order unless the defen-
dant challenges that person’s authority.319  Because D.J. did not contest the 
security guard’s authority at trial, the Third District affirmed the convic-
tion.320  D.J. filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court of Florida on 
the ground that the Third District’s decision expressly and directly conflicted 
with the supreme court’s decision in State v. Dye.321  In contrast, in B.C. v. 
State,322 the First District held that, “the State must prove the involvement of 
the principal or his/her designee to establish a violation of section 
  
 312. 36 Fla. L. Weekly D2358 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2011). 
 313. Id. at D2358 (citing Williams, 66 So. 3d at 365; Blackmon v. State, 58 So. 3d 343, 
347 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 67 So. 3d 198 (Fla. 2011); Kiss v. State, 42 So. 
3d 810, 811, 813 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010)). 
 314. FLA. STAT. § 810.097(2) (2012); see also FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 13.5(b) 
(2007). 
 315. D.J. v. State (D.J. II), 67 So. 3d 1029, 1033 (Fla. 2011). 
 316. 43 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010), 
and quashed, 67 So. 3d 1029 (Fla. 2011). 
 317. Id. at 177 (citing FLA. STAT. § 810.097). 
 318. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 810.097(2). 
 319. D.J. I, 43 So. 3d at 177 (quoting Downer v. State, 375 So. 2d 840, 845–46 (Fla. 
1979)). 
 320. See id. 
 321. D.J. II, 67 So. 3d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 2011) (citing State v. Dye, 346 So. 2d 538, 542 
(Fla. 1977)). 
 322. 70 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
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810.097(2).”323  Because this decision conflicted with D.J. I, the First District 
certified conflict.324 
This conflict was resolved by the Supreme Court of Florida in D.J. v. 
State (D.J. II).325  Without mentioning B.C., the court quashed D.J.’s convic-
tion and held that the State must prove both the identity of the individual 
who warned defendant to leave school grounds and that individual’s authori-
ty to control access to the property as necessary elements of the crime.326  
This conclusion was supported by the plain language of both the statute and 
the applicable standard jury instruction, the court wrote.327  It was also sup-
ported by the court’s own decision in Dye,328 which held that a trespass con-
viction requires proof of the identity and authority of the person issuing the 
warning.329  Under that standard, the State had failed to present evidence that 
the school’s security guard was the principal’s designee, or was otherwise 
authorized to limit access to school property, and had not cited any “rule or 
statute indicating that a school security guard, by virtue of his or her title, 
would possess such authority as a matter of law.”330 
H. Miscellaneous 
In Anderson v. State,331 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the of-
fense of driving with a suspended license in violation of section 322.34 of 
the Florida Statutes did not require actual knowledge of the suspension by 
the defendant.332  The knowledge element of the offense is satisfied, the court 
wrote, by evidence that written notice was mailed to a defendant’s last 
known address, and proof that this was the defendant’s address at the time of 
mailing.333  In so ruling, the court disapproved of the decisions of the First 
and Fourth District courts in Haygood v. State334 and Brown v. State,335 which 
  
 323. Id. at 669. 
 324. Id. at 671. 
 325. 67 So. 3d. 1029, 1035 (Fla. 2011). 
 326. Id. (citing Dye, 346 So. 2d at 542). 
 327. Id. at 1033–34 (citing FLA. STAT. § 810.097(2) (2012); FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 
13.5(b) (2007)). 
 328. Id. at 1035 (citing Dye, 346 So. 2d at 541–42). 
 329. Dye, 346 So. 2d at 541 (citing FLA. STAT. § 810.09(2)(a) (1975) (current version at 
FLA. STAT. § 810.09(2)(b) (2012)). 
 330. D.J. II, 67 So. 3d at 1035 (citing Dye, 346 So. 2d at 542). 
 331. 87 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 2012). 
 332. See id. at 781; see also FLA. STAT. § 322.34(2) (2012). 
 333. Anderson, 87 So. 3d at 781. 
 334. 17 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam), abrogated by Anderson v. 
State, 87 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 2012). 
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required the State to prove actual receipt of a license suspension notice to 
establish knowledge of that suspension.336 
The Third District reviewed the dismissal of a cannabis trafficking 
charge in State v. Estrada,337 holding that Florida’s statutory definition of 
cannabis includes the moisture of a fresh marijuana plant.338  The seized can-
nabis at issue weighed twenty-six pounds at the time of arrest but, after se-
creting moisture in storage, it weighed less than the statutory threshold for 
trafficking.339  The trial court dismissed the trafficking charge, reasoning that 
the weight of cannabis does not include moisture because wet marijuana 
cannot be sold on the market.340  The appellate court disagreed and held that 
the statutory definition of cannabis in section 893.02(3) excludes excess wa-
ter weight that is “not inherent in the [marijuana] plant’s vegetable mat-
ter.”341  The court further defined the term “excess water” as “‘water that has 
been added extrinsically to . . . or . . . accidentally acquired’” by the 
marijuana.342  In Estrada, the type of water that drained from the marijuana 
while it was in evidence storage was “inherent” in its vegetable matter 
because the live plants had been seized from the defendant’s lab and vehicle, 
and “had not fallen into a canal or other body of water.”343  The court ac-
knowledged a contrary interpretation in Hatch v. State, Department of Reve-
nue,344 where the First District held that the weight of seized marijuana ex-
cludes the moisture of a fresh marijuana plant.345  However, the court distin-
guished Hatch because it was “limited to tax assessment cases” that require 
  
 335. 764 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), overruled in part by An-
derson v. State, 87 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 2012). 
 336. Anderson, 87 So. 3d at 779–81 (citing Haygood, 17 So. 3d at 896; Brown, 764 So. 2d 
at 743–44). 
 337. 76 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 338. Id. at 372–73 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 893.02(3) (2012)). 
 339. Id. at 374; see also FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(a). 
 340. Estrada, 76 So. 3d at 372. 
 341. Id. at 373 (quoting State v. Velasquez, 879 So. 2d 1259, 1260 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2004) (per curiam).  Cannabis is defined as “all parts of any plant of the genus Cannabis, 
whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and 
every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant or its seeds 
or resin.”  FLA. STAT. § 893.02(3). 
 342. Estrada, 76 So. 3d at 373 (quoting Cronin v. State, 470 So. 2d 802, 803 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App. 1985)). 
 343. See id. at 374 (citing Cronin, 470 So. 2d at 804). 
 344. 585 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
 345. Estrada, 76 So. 3d at 373 n.5 (quoting Hatch, 585 So. 2d at 1079). 
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courts to estimate the retail price of cannabis.346  Accordingly, the Third Dis-
trict reversed the order dismissing the charges.347 
In Pinkney v. State,348 the Second District clarified the mental state re-
quired for assault under section 784.011(1) of the Florida Statutes.349  This 
defendant was charged with aggravated assault because he backed his ve-
hicle in the direction of a police officer.350  On appeal, Pinkney argued that 
the State had not proven his “specific intent to do violence to [his] victim,”351 
as required by the Second District in State v. Shorette.352  Conceding that this 
was an accurate statement of Shorette, the court nevertheless receded from 
that case on the ground that it incorrectly stated the law.353  In so ruling, the 
court held that the State must prove that the defendant’s act “was substantial-
ly certain to put the victim in fear of imminent violence, not that the defen-
dant had the intent to do violence to the victim.”354  A statute’s use of the 
word “intentionally,” without more, signifies that the statute “‘prohibits ei-
ther a specific voluntary act or something that is substantially certain to re-
sult from the act,’” rather than an act committed accidentally or negligent-
ly.355  Thus, the “‘subjective intent to cause the particular result is irrele-
vant,’” the court explained.356  In light of his vehicle’s proximity to the offic-
er, Pinkney’s act constituted a threat of violence because it was substantially 
certain to put the officer in fear of imminent violence.357 
The issue confronting the First District in Wess v. State358 was whether a 
defendant commits robbery by sudden snatching by taking property that is 
“close to the victim or within the victim’s reach or control.”359  The victim in 
this case was sitting on a bench with her purse next to her, touching her 
hip.360  She felt it move and then spotted the defendant running away with 
  
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. at 374. 
 348. 74 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (en banc), reviewed denied, 95 So. 3d 213 
(Fla. 2012). 
 349. Id. at 576 (citing FLA. STAT. § 784.011(1) (2012)). 
 350. Id. at 573–74. 
 351. Id. at 575. 
 352. 404 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 784.011, 
.021). 
 353. Pinkney, 74 So. 3d at 575. 
 354. Id. at 576. 
 355. Id. (quoting Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244, 247 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (en 
banc)). 
 356. Id. (quoting Linehan, 442 So. 2d at 247). 
 357. Id. at 577. 
 358. 67 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 359. Id. at 1135–36. 
 360. Id. at 1134. 
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it.361  Wess was convicted of robbery by sudden snatching under section 
812.131 of the Florida Statutes, which applies when money or other property 
is taken “from the victim’s person.”362  The appellate court interpreted this 
phrase to require the property to be “on” the person of the victim.363  The 
essential difference between this crime and robbery, which applies when 
property is taken from a “victim’s immediate vicinity and/or control,”364 is 
that robbery by sudden snatching requires property to be “‘abruptly and un-
expectedly plucked from the embrace of the person.’”365  It is not enough that 
the property is next to her, even if it is touching her or within her reach or 
control.366  Therefore, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction for rob-
bery by sudden snatching and directed the trial court to enter a judgment for 
misdemeanor theft.367 
In State v. Morival,368 a case of first impression, the Second District 
held that a defendant’s act of repeatedly depriving his dogs of nourishment 
over an extended period was properly charged as felony animal cruelty.369  In 
this case, the discovery of the defendant’s dogs in a severely undernourished 
and emaciated condition led to charges against him for felony animal cruelty 
under section 828.12(2) of the Florida Statutes.370  The trial court granted 
Morival’s motion to dismiss on the ground “that failure to feed a dog can 
constitute no more than a misdemeanor.”371  On appeal, however, the Second 
District concluded that the felony and misdemeanor provisions of section 
828.12 properly distinguished between a temporary and short-term depriva-
tion of necessary sustenance and extended deprivation causing malnutri-
tion.372  Because the dogs were extremely emaciated, the court found that 
Morival’s failure to provide food could be considered “excessive or repeated 
infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering” under the felony animal cruelty 
  
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. at 1134–35 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 812.131(1) (2012)). 
 363. Wess, 67 So. 3d at 1137. 
 364. Id. at 1135. 
 365. Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 848 So. 2d 361, 364 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)). 
 366. See id. at 1136–37. 
 367. Id. at 1137. 
 368. 75 So. 3d 810 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 369. Id. at 810, 812. 
 370. Id. at 810–11 (citing FLA. STAT. § 828.12(2) (2012)).  Under section 828.12(2), any 
intentional act resulting in “the cruel death, or excessive or repeated infliction of unnecessary 
pain or suffering" of an animal is a felony.  FLA. STAT. § 828.12(2). 
 371. Morival, 75 So. 3d at 811. 
 372. Id. at 812; see also FLA. STAT. § 828.12(1)–(2). 
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provision.373  The court therefore reversed and remanded on the ground that 
the issue could not “be resolved by a motion to dismiss.”374 
III. DEFENSES 
A. Abandonment 
The defense of abandonment was at issue in Rockmore v. State.375  In 
this case, as Rockmore left a store without paying for goods in his posses-
sion, a store employee pursued him and caused him to drop the merchan-
dise.376  The employee chased him to his car, where Rockmore displayed a 
firearm.377  At trial, he argued that no robbery had occurred because he had 
abandoned the goods before displaying the firearm.378  The trial court denied 
his motion for judgment of acquittal and his request for a special jury instruc-
tion on the defense of abandonment.379 
On appeal of his conviction for robbery with a firearm, the Fifth District 
considered both the meaning of the term “abandonment” and the effect of the 
1987 amendments to Florida’s robbery statute.380  These amendments ex-
panded robbery to include the use or threat of force “‘in the course of the 
taking.’”381  This phrase includes acts “‘subsequent to the taking,’” provided 
both the act and the taking are part of a “‘continuous series of acts or 
events.’”382  The court defined the phrase “‘continuous series of acts or 
events’” as an uninterrupted “‘sequence of related acts or events’” that would 
include both flight and discarding stolen goods.383  The court also expressed 
doubt that discarding stolen merchandise when grabbed by a pursuing mer-
chant is the same as ‘“abandonment,”’ which typically excludes an involun-
  
 373. See Morival, 75 So. 3d at 811–12 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 828.12(2)). 
 374. Id. at 812. 
 375. 37 Fla. L. Weekly D533, D534 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2012). 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. at D534–35 (citing Simmons v. State, 551 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 
1989) (per curiam); State v. Baker, 540 So. 2d 847, 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)). 
 380. Rockmore, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D534–35; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3)(b) (2012); 
Act effective Oct. 1, 1987, ch. 87-315, § 812.13, 1987 Fla. Laws 2052, 2052 (amending FLA. 
STAT. § 812.13 (1986)). 
 381. Rockmore, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D534 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3)(b) (2012)). 
 382. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3)(b)). 
 383. Id. at D535 (citing Series, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/series?q=series (last visited Oct. 28, 2012)); 
see also FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3)(b). 
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tary act motivated by fear of apprehension.384  Even if Rockmore’s acts con-
stituted abandonment, however, a judgment of acquittal was precluded by the 
factual dispute as to whether he had dropped all the merchandise before dis-
playing the firearm.385  Moreover, no special jury instruction on abandon-
ment was required, the court held, because the standard instruction tracks the 
statutory language and the proffered special instruction inaccurately stated 
the law.386  Upholding the conviction, the Fifth District acknowledged con-
flict with a line of cases holding that the taking and the force or threat are not 
a ‘“continuous series of acts or events”’ if the property is abandoned before 
the defendant uses some force or threat to escape.387 
B. Prescription Defense 
Section 893.13(6)(a) of the Florida Statutes sets out an affirmative de-
fense to criminal charges based on possession of certain controlled sub-
stances that have been “lawfully obtained from a practitioner or pursuant to a 
valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
or her professional practice.”388  Section 499.03 of the Florida Statutes also 
provides a prescription defense to charges based on possession of a prescrip-
tion drug or possession of a prescription drug “with intent to sell, dispense, 
or deliver” except when “obtained by a valid prescription of a practitioner 
licensed by law to prescribe the drug.”389  During the survey period, Florida’s 
appellate courts were called upon to interpret this defense in a variety of situ-
ations.390 
In the first category of cases, the issue was whether the prescription de-
fense is available to an innocent possessor of another person’s prescribed 
drugs.391  Until the decision of the First District in McCoy v. State,392 no Flor-
  
 384. Rockmore, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D534–35, D536 n.2; see also FLA. STAT. § 
777.04(5)(a). 
 385. Rockmore, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D534–35. 
 386. Id. at D535 (citing State v. White, 891 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. 2004); State v. Hubbard, 
751 So. 2d 552, 558 (Fla. 1999); City of Tampa v. Long, 638 So. 2d 35, 39 (Fla. 1994)). 
 387. Id. at D534–35 (citing Peterson v. State, 24 So. 3d 686, 690 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2009); Simmons v. State, 551 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam); 
State v. Baker, 540 So. 2d 847, 847–48 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)); see also FLA. STAT. § 
812.13(3)(b). 
 388. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(6)(a). 
 389. Id. § 499.03(1). 
 390. See, e.g., Knipp v. State, 67 So. 3d 376, 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (analyzing 
FLA. STAT. §§ 499.03(1), 893.13); McCoy v. State, 56 So. 3d 37, 39 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 391. E.g., McCoy, 56 So. 3d at 39. 
 392. 56 So. 3d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
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ida court had ever decided this issue.393  McCoy was convicted of trafficking 
in hydrocodone based upon her possession of a pill bottle that contained Lor-
cet tablets and bore a label in her husband’s name.394  She claimed that she 
was carrying the pills for her husband, who held a valid prescription.395  Re-
versing her conviction, the court first noted that when the language of section 
893.13(6)(a) is read in conjunction with other state pharmaceutical laws, the 
words “lawfully obtained” authorize possession pursuant to an agency rela-
tionship.396  The court held that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on 
the prescription defense constituted fundamental error, compounded by the 
prosecutor’s misleading and legally incorrect argument that McCoy had no 
right to carry her husband’s pills.397  In State v. Latona,398 the Fifth District 
applied the prescription defense in section 893.13(6)(a) to a home health care 
nurse charged with possession after three prescription bottles bearing her 
patient’s name were found in her purse during a traffic stop.399  Dismissal 
was warranted as a matter of law, the court held, based on the express terms 
of an executed durable power of attorney that expressly authorized her to 
hold her patient’s property, and based on the absence of any notice of revo-
cation to the defendant of that authority.400 
In the second category of cases, the issue was whether a valid prescrip-
tion defense is vitiated by a violation of Florida’s “doctor shopping” law.401  
The doctor shopping statute prohibits individuals from seeking multiple pre-
scriptions for controlled substances within a thirty-day period without dis-
closing the other prescriptions to one of the prescribing doctors.402  In Knipp 
  
 393. Id. at 39. 
 394. Id. at 38. 
 395. See id. 
 396. Id. at 39 (construing FLA. STAT. §§ 465.003(6), 893.04(2)(a) (2012)); see also FLA. 
STAT. § 893.13(6)(a). 
 397. McCoy, 56 So. 3d at 40–41; see also Williams v. State, 85 So. 3d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (finding error where the court failed to instruct the jury on the pre-
scription defense in spite of the defendant’s evidence that she temporarily possessed the clo-
nazepam “at the request of the prescription holder,” whose memory problems sometimes 
prevented her from taking her pills at the correct time); Ayotte v. State, 67 So. 3d 330, 331–32 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (finding fundamental error where the court failed to instruct the 
jury on the prescription defense in spite of the defendant’s claim that he was holding the pills 
for his girlfriend who had a valid prescription). 
 398. 75 So. 3d 394 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 399. Id. at 395 (analyzing FLA. STAT. § 893.13(6)(a)). 
 400. Id. at 395–96 (citing Fla.-Ga. Chem., Inc. v. Nat’l Labs. Inc., 153 So. 2d 752, 754 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963)). 
 401. E.g., Knipp v. State, 67 So. 3d 376, 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (analyzing 
FLA. STAT. § 893.13(7)(a)8.). 
 402. Id. at 378–79 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 893.13(7)(a)8.).  Pursuant to section 
893.13(7)(a)8. of the Florida Statutes, it is unlawful for any person: 
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v. State,403 the defendants were charged with doctor shopping and trafficking 
by possession, which occurs when the amount of the controlled substance in 
the individual’s possession “exceed[s] the legal limit set by the trafficking 
statute.”404  The trial court denied their motions to dismiss the doctor shop-
ping charges but dismissed the trafficking charges because “each defendant 
possessed a valid prescription” written by a licensed physician.405  The 
Fourth District affirmed.406  The court rejected the State’s argument that the 
violations of the doctor shopping statute invalidated the defendants’ prescrip-
tions as a matter of law, stating: 
[N]othing in either sections 499.03(2) or 893.13(7)(a)8., Florida 
Statutes, eliminates the valid prescription defense to trafficking or 
possession of a controlled substance if the prescription is obtained 
in violation of the doctor shopping statute.  That may have been 
the intention of the Legislature, but we are constrained by the rules 
of statutory interpretation to follow the plain language of the sta-
tute.407 
The Fourth District applied Knipp in Wagner v. State,408 where the de-
fendant was charged with doctor shopping and trafficking by sale.409  Here, 
Wagner obtained Oxycodone prescriptions from two different physicians 
during a thirty-day period without disclosing the duplicate prescriptions to 
either doctor.410  He then brought four prescription bottles to sell to an indi-
vidual who was a confidential informant and was arrested when he arrived at 
the sale.411  In a special jury instruction, the trial court limited the prescrip-
tion defense to controlled substances “lawfully obtained for a lawful purpose 
  
[To] [w]ithhold information from a practitioner from whom the person seeks to obtain a con-
trolled substance or a prescription for a controlled substance that the person making the request 
has received a controlled substance or a prescription for a controlled substance of like thera-
peutic use from another practitioner within the previous 30 days. 
FLA. STAT. § 893.13(7)(a)8. 
 403. 67 So. 3d 376 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 404. Id. at 377–78; see also Gonzalez v. State, 84 So. 3d 362, 363 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2012) (per curiam) (directing the trial court to vacate the conviction for trafficking by posses-
sion where the defendant obtained a valid prescription by misrepresenting to her physician 
that she had not obtained a narcotic prescription within the prior thirty days). 
 405. Knipp, 67 So. 3d at 378. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. at 380 (footnote omitted) (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)); 
see also FLA. STAT. §§ 499.03(2), 893.13(7)(a)8. 
 408. 88 So. 3d 250 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 409. Id. at 251–53. 
 410. Id. at 251. 
 411. Id. at 251–52. 
40
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss1/2
2012] CRIMINAL LAW:  2010–2012 SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW 41 
 
from a practitioner or pursuant to a valid prescription . . . .”412  The problem 
with this instruction was that it replaced the statutory phrase “‘while acting 
in the course of his or her professional practice’” with the phrase “‘for a law-
ful purpose.’”413  The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and Wagner 
appealed.414  Citing Knipp, the Fourth District concluded that the validity of 
Wagner’s prescription was not affected by either his violation of the doctor 
shopping statute or his decision to sell the contents of that prescription.415  
Because “the trial court’s jury instruction misstated the law, misled the jury, 
and negated Wagner’s only defense,” the appellate court reversed the traf-
ficking conviction and remanded for a new trial on that charge.416 
Although Wagner was charged with trafficking by sale, it is important 
to note that he was arrested before he could deliver the pills to any individu-
al.417  It was not clear whether the prescription defense would have afforded 
him shelter if he had delivered or sold his prescription pills to a person with-
out a prescription for that drug.418  The First District appeared to take this 
step, however, in Glovacz v. State,419 where the defendant was convicted of 
trafficking after she gave hydrocodone to an undercover officer.420  Glovacz 
presented a prescription defense at trial, claiming she expected the officer to 
return the pills in the same amount when the officer obtained her own pre-
scription.421  The appellate court reversed the conviction for fundamental 
error because the jury was not instructed on the prescription defense and 
because the State suggested to the jury that Glovacz’s possession of her own 
pills before handing them to the officer could support a trafficking convic-
tion.422  This case is noteworthy because the appellate court held that Glovacz 
was entitled to a jury instruction on the prescription defense even though she 
completed delivery of the controlled substance to the officer.423 
  
 412. Id. at 252 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 413. Wagner, 88 So. 3d at 252. 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. at 253 (citing Knipp v. State, 67 So. 3d 376, 380 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011)). 
 416. Id. 
 417. See id. at 252. 
 418. Compare Wagner, 88 So. 3d at 253, with Singleton v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:07-
cv-1419-T-33MAP, 2009 WL 975783, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2009) (acknowledging that the 
defendant’s valid prescription provided no defense to an attempted trafficking charge under 
Florida law). 
 419. 60 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 420. Id. at 424. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. at 425–26. 
 423. Id. at 424–26. 
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C. Self-Defense 
The Second District considered the forcible felony exception to self-
defense in Santiago v. State.424  This exception provides that self-defense is 
not available as a defense if the act occurred while the defendant was “at-
tempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of, a forc-
ible felony.”425  At trial, Santiago claimed that, on the date in question, he 
was approached by three men with whom he had an earlier altercation.426  
When one man appeared to reach for a gun, Santiago pulled out a handgun, 
fired, and killed one man.427  As a result, he was charged with, and convicted 
of, first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder.428  The forcible 
felonies at issue concerned aggressive action taken by Santiago toward the 
police officers pursuing him as he fled from the scene.429  These actions re-
sulted in convictions for resisting arrest with violence and aggravated fleeing 
and eluding, and acquittals for “aggravated assault on a law enforcement 
officer.”430 
Santiago’s motion for postconviction relief, which claimed ineffective 
assistance of counsel, was denied on the ground that the multiple murder and 
attempted murder charges were sufficient, in and of themselves, to require 
the forcible felony instruction.431  The Second District reversed, holding that 
the facts “do not show that Santiago was engaged in a separate and indepen-
dent forcible felony” at the time of the shooting.432  First, the court wrote, 
“the applicability of the forcible felony instruction is not determined solely 
by the number of offenses with which the defendant is charged.”433  Second, 
because Santiago raised self-defense to all homicide-related charges, no sep-
arately charged forcible felony remained to trigger the exception.434  Third, 
the forcible felonies were temporally separate from his defensive act.435  Fi-
nally, the aggravated assaults could not have constituted the forcible felonies 
in question, as the State argued on appeal, because the jury was instructed “at 
  
 424. 88 So. 3d 1020, 1022 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 425. FLA. STAT. § 776.041(1) (2012). 
 426. Santiago, 88 So. 3d at 1023. 
 427. Id. 
 428. Id. at 1023–24. 
 429. Id. at 1023, 1025. 
 430. Id. at 1024 n.1. 
 431. Santiago, 88 So. 3d at 1024–25. 
 432. Id. at 1024. 
 433. Id. at 1025. 
 434. Id. 
 435. Id. 
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the State’s request, that the applicable forcible felony was murder.”436  There-
fore, finding that Santiago’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was 
facially sufficient, the court reversed the summary denial of his post-
conviction claim and remanded for further proceedings.437 
The standard jury instructions on self-defense were called into question 
in Bassallo v. State,438 where the defendant was charged with aggravated 
assault with a deadly weapon after an altercation with a co-worker.439  At 
trial, the defense presented a theory of justifiable use of force in self-
defense.440  Without a defense objection, the trial court gave the standard 
self-defense instruction, which states that self-defense applies only if the 
victim suffered an injury.441  However, the State presented no evidence of 
victim injury at trial and, during closing argument, pointed out that the self-
defense instruction made no sense because the victim was not injured.442  On 
appeal of his conviction, the Fourth District agreed with Bassallo’s claim of 
fundamental error because the instruction inaccurately stated the law, injury 
was not an element of aggravated assault, and the State presented no evi-
dence of injury to the victim.443  Moreover, the guilty verdict could not have 
been obtained without the instructional error,444 which was compounded by 
the prosecutor’s comments.445  The court therefore reversed his conviction 
and remanded for a new trial.446  As a result of the decision in Bassallo, this 
instruction is presently under review by the Committee on Standard Jury 
Instructions in Criminal Cases.447 
In Montijo v. State,448 the Fifth District held that a trial court’s “inclu-
sion of the phrase ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in [a] jury instruction” on 
  
 436. Santiago, 88 So. 3d at 1025. 
 437. Id. 
 438. 46 So. 3d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 439. Id. at 1207, 1210; see also FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 3.6(f) (2010) (“It is a de-
fense to the offense with which (defendant) is charged if the [death of] [injury to] (victim) 
resulted from the justifiable use of deadly force.”); id. 3.6(g). 
 440. Basallo, 46 So. 3d at 1211. 
 441. Id. at 1210; see also FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 3.6(f), (g). 
 442. Basallo, 46 So. 3d at 1210–11. 
 443. Id. 
 444. See id. at 1209. 
 445. See id. at 1211. 
 446. Id.; see also Brown v. State, 59 So. 3d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 
(finding fundamental error in the giving of the standard self-defense instruction for battery on 
a law enforcement officer, where the statute did not require injury, the State did not prove 
injury, and the State argued that the instruction was inapplicable because the victim did not 
suffer injury). 
 447. Alerts – Criminal Jury Instructions, supra note 193. 
 448. 61 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
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self-defense constituted fundamental error because it shifted the burden to 
the defendant to prove self-defense, which in turn deprived him of a fair tri-
al.449  The court emphasized that because defendants are required only to 
“present enough evidence to support giving the [self-defense] instruction,” 
the trial court’s instruction should have referred only to the requisite ele-
ments and not to the burden of proof.450  Accordingly, the Fifth District re-
versed the defendant’s conviction for manslaughter with a deadly weapon 
and referred the issue to the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in 
Criminal Cases.451  The Committee has recommended that Instructions 3.6(f) 
and (g) on the justifiable use of force be amended to “omit any reference to 
burden of proof.”452 
D. Stand Your Ground Law 
Under Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law,453 which was signed into 
law on April 26, 2005, an individual is permitted to use defensive force, 
“without fear of prosecution or civil action,”454 against anyone who “unlaw-
fully and forcibly enter[s] [the] dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle” of 
another person.455  The law also abrogated the common law duty to retreat 
before using defensive force whenever the actor “is not engaged in an unlaw-
ful activity and . . . is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right 
to be.”456  Until the recent fatal shooting of an unarmed teenager in Sanford, 
Florida, the law had generated scant controversy in Florida’s judicial sys-
tem.457  When Trayvon Martin was shot and killed by George Zimmerman, 
who claimed that Martin had attacked him, the police cited the Stand Your 
  
 449. Id. at 427. 
 450. Id.; see also Alvarado v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1607, D1607 (5th Dist. Ct. App. 
July 6, 2012) (per curiam) (citing Montijo, 61 So. 3d at 427) (reversing the defendant’s con-
victions and remanding for a new trial on the authority of Montijo). 
 451. Montijo, 61 So. 3d at 427 & n.4. 
 452. Amendments to the Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 1, 2012, 
at 22–23. 
 453. The term “Stand Your Ground Law” refers to sections 776.012–.013 and 776.031–
.032 of the Florida Statutes collectively.  Montanez v. State, 24 So. 3d 799, 801 (Fla. 2d Dist. 
Ct. App. 2010); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012–.013, .031–.032 (2012). 
 454. Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, § 5, 2005 Fla. Laws 199, 202 (codified as 
amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012–.013, .031–.032 (2012)).  Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012, 
.031 (2004) (amended 2005), with FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012–.013, .031–.032 (2012). 
 455. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a) (2012). 
 456. Id. § 776.013(2)(a). 
 457. Frances Robles, Lt. Gov.:  Stand Your Ground Is Not ‘Shoot First’ Law, LEDGER 
(Lakeland), June 12, 2012. 
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Ground Law as the reason Zimmerman was not immediately arrested.458  
Zimmerman has since been charged with second-degree murder, and Gover-
nor Rick Scott has convened a nineteen-member Task Force on Citizen Safe-
ty and Protection to address ambiguities in the Stand Your Ground Law.459 
Otherwise, the most contentious issue surrounding this law has involved 
the proper procedural vehicle to be employed in statutory immunity cases.  
This immunity is provided in section 776.032, which states that in certain 
circumstances a person may use deadly force to stand his ground against an 
attacker without fearing prosecution.460  The question dividing the district 
courts of appeal was whether factual disputes should be resolved at a pretrial 
evidentiary hearing or at trial.461 
This conflict was resolved during the survey period in Dennis v. 
State,462 where the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that when a defen-
dant invokes immunity from prosecution in a pretrial motion, the trial court 
must conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing and “decide the factual question 
of the applicability of the statutory immunity.”463  The court explained that 
the plain language of “[s]ection 776.032(1) expressly grants defendants a 
substantive right to not be arrested, detained, charged, or prosecuted as a 
result of the use of legally justified force.”464  This grant of immunity from 
criminal prosecution differs from the affirmative defense of self-defense and 
must be interpreted to “provide[] the defendant with more protection from 
prosecution for a justified use of force than the probable cause determination 
previously provided to the defendant by rule.”465  Otherwise, the legislation 
would have been an exercise in futility, the court said.466  The court neverthe-
less found that the error was harmless because Dennis never claimed that the 
trial was unfair, that the pretrial ruling limited his defense, or that the evi-
  
 458. Id. 
 459. Id.; see Governor Rick Scott Announces New State Attorney and Task Force in Re-
sponse to Trayvon Martin Incident, RICK SCOTT:  45TH GOVERNOR OF FLA. (Mar. 22, 2012), 
http://www.flgov.com/2012/03/22/governor-rick-scott-announces-new-state-attorney-and-
task-force-in-response-to-trayvon-martin-incident/. 
 460. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1).  The legislature passed the law that created section 
776.032 because it determined “that it is proper for law-abiding people to protect themselves, 
their families, and others from intruders and attackers without fear of prosecution or civil 
action for acting in defense of themselves and others.”  Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-
27, § 776.013, 2005 Fla. Laws 199, 199–200 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012–
.013, .031–.032 (2012)). 
 461. Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 460 (Fla. 2010). 
 462. 51 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2010). 
 463. Id. at 458. 
 464. Id. at 462 (citing FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1)). 
 465. Id. at 463. 
 466. See id. (quoting Martinez v. State, 981 So. 2d 449, 452 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam)). 
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dence he would have presented at a hearing differed from that presented at 
trial.467  Accordingly, the court affirmed the Fourth District’s decision that 
Dennis was not entitled to relief.468 
In Mocio v. State,469 the Second District held that when challenging a 
trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss under the Stand Your Ground Law, 
the proper remedy is a petition for writ of prohibition.470  In this case, which 
involved a domestic battery, the county court held the required evidentiary 
hearing, concluded that Mocio’s actions were unreasonable, and denied his 
motion to dismiss.471  The circuit court then denied his petition for writ of 
prohibition on the ground that it was the wrong vehicle to challenge the 
county court’s exercise of jurisdiction over him and that he “had an adequate 
remedy via direct appeal if convicted.”472  The Second District disagreed 
because settled law clearly establishes “that a writ of prohibition is a proper 
remedy for an accused who is challenging his continued prosecution based 
on grounds of immunity.”473  If the petition is denied on the merits, however, 
“res judicata bars re-litigation of the immunity claims on appeal.474  This was 
the decision of the First District in Rice v. State,475 where the court reasoned 
that “denial of the petition . . . reflects this court’s determination that the trial 
court did not err in denying Rice’s claim of immunity under the Stand Your 
Ground [L]aw.”476   
A different issue arose in Dorsey v. State,477 where the Fourth District 
was called upon to decide how a jury should be instructed when the defen-
dant is “‘engaged in an unlawful activity’ at the time . . . deadly force” is 
used against an attacker.478  This case involved a convicted felon’s use of a 
concealed firearm to kill two attackers who were part of a group that sur-
rounded him as his back was against a vehicle.479  During the charging confe-
rence, the defense made two requests.480  The first request asked the court to 
  
 467. Dennis, 51 So. 3d at 463–64. 
 468. Id. at 463–64. 
 469. 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1746 (2d Dist. Ct. App. July 25, 2012). 
 470. Id. at D1746. 
 471. Id. 
 472. Id. 
 473. Id. (citing Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 1977); State ex rel. Rey-
nolds v. Newell, 102 So. 2d 613, 615 (Fla. 1958); State ex rel. Marshall v. Petteway, 164 So. 
872, 874 (Fla. 1935) (en banc)). 
 474. Rice v. State, 90 So. 3d 929, 929, 931 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 475. 90 So. 3d 929 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 476. Id. at 931. 
 477. 74 So. 3d 521 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 478. See id. at 525–26; see also FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2012). 
 479. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 522–23. 
 480. Id. at 525–26. 
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exclude the Stand Your Ground instruction because Dorsey was “engaged in 
an unlawful activity” and had no right to stand his ground without retreat-
ing.481  The second request asked the court to give a special instruction based 
on “the pre-2005 standard jury instruction [for] the justifiable use of deadly 
force,” which would have informed the jury of the scope of the duty to re-
treat when a defendant is engaged in an unlawful activity.482  The court de-
nied both requests and gave the jury the standard Stand Your Ground instruc-
tion based on section 776.013(3).483  Dorsey was convicted, inter alia, of two 
counts of second-degree murder.484 
On appeal, the Fourth District decided, as a threshold matter, “that pos-
session of a firearm by a convicted felon qualifies as ‘unlawful activity’” 
under Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law.485  The court also decided that the 
common law retreat rule is available to a defendant whose unlawful activity 
has deprived him of the right to stand his ground, provided he faces immi-
nent danger of death or great bodily harm and finds retreat to be impossible 
or futile.486  In this case, the standard instruction informed the jury that Dor-
sey’s unlawful activity deprived him of the right to stand his ground without 
retreating, but failed to explain the common law duty to retreat in Dorsey’s 
unique circumstances.487  This goal could have been accomplished, the court 
explained, by giving both the defendant’s specially requested instruction and 
the Stand Your Ground instruction, or by providing only the pre-2005 stan-
dard instruction on self-defense.488  Concluding that the evidence would sup-
port a conviction for manslaughter only, the court reversed the defendant’s 
second-degree murder convictions and remanded for retrial on manslaughter 
charges.489 
  
 481. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3). 
 482. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 526; see also FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 3.6(f) (2000) 
(amended 2010). 
 483. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 526; see also FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3). 
 484. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 522. 
 485. Id. at 527; see also FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3). 
 486. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 525–27 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3); FLA. STD. JURY 
INSTR. (CRIM.) 3.6(f) (2010)) (citing State v. Rivera, 719 So. 2d 335, 338 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 1998) (per curiam); Thompson v. State, 552 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
1989)). 
 487. Id. at 527. 
 488. Id. at 528. 
 489. Id. at 522, 528. 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
During the survey period, Florida courts faced issues relating to the ex-
ecution of mentally retarded defendants, the modification of the state’s lethal 
injection protocol, and the imposition of life-without-parole sentences on 
juvenile offenders.490 
1. Execution of Mentally Retarded Defendants 
In 2001, the Florida Legislature enacted legislation prohibiting the ex-
ecution of mentally retarded defendants and establishing a procedure for 
determining which capital defendants are mentally retarded.491  The follow-
ing year, in Atkins v. Virginia,492 the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that the execution of a mentally retarded criminal defendant constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment.493  However, the Court relegated to the states the 
task of determining specific rules for classifying defendants as mentally re-
tarded.494  Since then, Florida has required an IQ score of seventy or below to 
establish “‘significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning.’”495  
During the survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the consti-
tutionality of this cut-off score in Franqui v. State,496 where the defendant 
argued that this threshold violated both the Eighth Amendment and the deci-
sion in Atkins because “Atkins approved a wider range of IQ . . . results that 
can meet the test for mental retardation.”497  The Franqui court rejected this 
argument, finding that Florida’s definition of mental retardation is consistent 
with diagnostic criteria used by the American Psychiatric Association and is 
  
 490. See Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 92 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 2110 (2012); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 538 (Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1 (2011); Manuel v. State, 48 So. 3d 94, 97 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review denied, 63 
So. 3d 750 (Fla.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 446 (2011). 
 491. FLA. STAT. § 921.137(2), (4); see also State v. Herring (Herring I), 76 So. 3d 891, 
894 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam) (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.137), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3707 
(U.S. June 25, 2012). 
 492. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 493. Id. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 406 (1986)). 
 494. Id. at 317 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405, 416–17). 
 495. Dufour v. State, 69 So. 3d 235, 246 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 
921.137(1)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1150 (2012). 
 496. 59 So. 3d 82 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2110 (2012).  The 
court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s mental retardation claim.  Id. at 
90, 106. 
 497. Id. at 92. 
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within “the broad authority given in Atkins to the states to enact their own 
laws to determine who is mentally retarded, without any requirement that the 
states adhere to one definition over another.”498  The court therefore affirmed 
the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s mental retardation claim.499 
2. Lethal Injection Protocol 
In Valle v. State,500 the Supreme Court of Florida rejected a condemned 
inmate’s claim that the Florida Department of Correction’s modified lethal 
injection protocol, which substituted pentobarbital for sodium thiopental as 
the first drug in its three-drug sequence, constitutes cruel and unusual pu-
nishment.501  Valle argued that there were “‘serious concerns’ regarding the 
efficacy of pentobarbital to render an inmate unconscious.”502  The court held 
that Valle had not demonstrated that pentobarbital was “sure or very likely to 
cause serious illness and needless suffering or that its use will result in a sub-
stantial risk of serious harm,” so as to constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment.503  Accordingly, the court affirmed the 
trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief and vacated the temporary stay of 
execution.504 
3. Life Sentences Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders 
In 2010, in Graham v. Florida,505 the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause prohibits the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juve-
nile offender for a nonhomicide offense.506  The Court specifically limited its 
holding to “those juvenile offenders sentenced to life-without-parole solely 
for a nonhomicide offense.”507  During the survey period, Florida’s appellate 
  
 498. Id. at 94 (citing Nixon v. State, 2 So. 3d 137, 143 (Fla. 2009) (per curiam)). 
 499. Id. at 90, 106; see also Herring I, 76 So. 3d 891, 895 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (citing Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1201 
(Fla. 2005) (per curiam)) (confirming that the Supreme Court of Florida has adopted a bright-
line rule that a death sentence is not precluded by a defendant’s intellectual disability unless 
the defendant’s IQ tests below seventy). 
 500. 70 So. 3d 530 (Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1 (2011). 
 501. Id. at 538, 546. 
 502. Id. at 536–37. 
 503. Id. at 541, 546 (citing DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319, 1326 n.4 (11th Cir. 
2011)). 
 504. Id. at 553. 
 505. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 506. Id. at 2030; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 507. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023. 
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courts have been called upon to consider whether Graham applies to convic-
tions for attempted murder, felony murder, and nonhomicide offenses com-
mitted in conjunction with homicide offenses, and to determine what consti-
tutes a life-without-parole sentence.508 
The Second District issued three opinions on the question of what con-
stitutes a nonhomicide offense.509  In Manuel v. State,510 the defendant re-
ceived a life sentence on one count of attempted first-degree murder, concur-
rent with forty years imprisonment on the second count.511  The court de-
clared that the life sentence was unconstitutional under Graham’s bright-line 
rule, reasoning “that attempted murder is a nonhomicide offense because 
death, by definition, has not occurred.”512  Accordingly, the court vacated the 
juvenile’s life sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.513  The First 
and Fourth Districts have followed Manuel to hold that attempted murder is a 
nonhomicide offense.514 
In Arrington v. State,515 the Second District decided that “felony murder 
is not a ‘nonhomicide’ offense for purposes of the categorical rule announced 
in Graham,” even when someone other than the juvenile offender actually 
committed the killing.516  Nevertheless, the court held that in this context, the 
trial court must have discretion to prevent a “grossly disproportionate” sen-
tence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.517  To this end, courts should 
engage in the three-prong, case-specific proportionality analysis endorsed in 
Graham, comparing:  (1) “[t]he gravity of the offense . . . to the severity of 
the sentence;” (2) the mandatory sentence “for juveniles involved in felony 
  
 508. See Arrington v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D155, D156 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 
2012); Washington v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D154, D155 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012); 
Thomas v. State, 78 So. 3d 644, 646 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam); Manuel v. 
State, 48 So. 3d 94, 95–97 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review denied, 63 So. 3d 750 (Fla. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 446 (2011). 
 509. See Arrington, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D156; Washington, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D155; 
Manuel, 48 So. 3d at 97. 
 510. 48 So. 3d 94 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review denied, 63 So. 3d 750 (Fla. 2011), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 446 (2011). 
 511. Id. at 96. 
 512. Id. at 97. 
 513. Id. at 97–98. 
 514. Cunningham v. State, 74 So. 3d 568, 569–70 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (citing 
McCullum v. State, 60 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.) (per curiam), review denied, 
67 So. 3d 1050 (Fla. 2011); Manuel, 48 So. 3d at 97); McCullum, 60 So. 3d at 503–04 (hold-
ing that, under Graham and Manuel, the juvenile’s life sentence for attempted second-degree 
murder was unconstitutional). 
 515. 37 Fla. L. Weekly D155 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012). 
 516. Id. at D156 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)). 
 517. Id. at D158. 
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murders with the sentences received by other [defendants] in Florida;” and 
(3) the mandatory sentence for juveniles involved in felony murders “with 
the sentences imposed for the same crime in other [states].”518  Applying this 
analysis to the facts of Arrington’s case, the Second District reversed and 
remanded on the ground that the mandatory life-without-parole sentence for 
felony murder was grossly disproportionate in this juvenile’s case.519  In La-
Fountain v. State,520 the Second District declined to apply Arrington retroac-
tively.521 
Finally, in Washington v. State,522 the Second District considered Gra-
ham’s “exception for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses in con-
junction with homicide offenses.”523  Here, the defendant appealed his sen-
tences of life-without-parole for kidnapping and felony murder offenses 
committed when he was a juvenile.524  In contrast to the juvenile in Arring-
ton, “Washington was nearly eighteen at the time of [his crimes],” and he 
participated extensively in acts of exceptional cruelty.525  The appellate court 
remanded for resentencing, holding that the trial “court [was] required to 
resentence [the defendant] to life without possibility of parole for these ho-
micides unless it determines under the facts of this case that such a penalty is 
disproportionate.”526  However, the court reversed the sentences for the kid-
napping offenses, finding that their constitutionality “probably hinges on 
whether the trial court, on remand, imposes life-without-parole for felony 
murders.” 527  In other words, after determining the appropriate sentences for 
the felony murders, the trial court might find the homicides to be “aggravat-
ing factor[s] in the sentencing of the [kidnapping] offense[s].”528  Until such 
a determination is made, however, the Second District was required to hold 
that the sentences of life-without-parole for kidnapping, a nonhomicide 
crime, constituted cruel and unusual punishment under Graham.529  Thus, the 
court reversed Washington’s sentences and directed the trial court to resen-
  
 518. Id. at D157. 
 519. Id. at D158. 
 520. 83 So. 3d 881 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 521. Id. at 883. 
 522. 37 Fla. L. Weekly D154 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012). 
 523. Id. at D155 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010)). 
 524. Id. at D154. 
 525. Id. at D155 (contrasting Arrington v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D155, D156 (2d Dist. 
Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012)). 
 526. Id. (citing Arrington, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D158). 
 527. Washington, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D155. 
 528. Id. (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023). 
 529. See id (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030). 
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tence for the kidnapping convictions after ascertaining appropriate sentences 
for the felony murders.530 
Florida’s appellate courts have also considered whether a term-of-years 
sentence for a juvenile is the “functional equivalent” of a life sentence.531  In 
Thomas v. State,532 the First District held that a fifty-year sentence was not a 
de facto sentence of life-without-parole because if Thomas served his entire 
sentence, he “would be in his late sixties when he [wa]s released from pris-
on.”533  The court reached the same result in Gridine v. State (Gridine I)534 
regarding a seventy-year sentence but later certified the following question 
as one of great public importance:  “Does the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Graham v. Florida prohibit sentencing a fourteen-year-old to a 
prison sentence of seventy years for the crime of attempted first-degree mur-
der?” 535 
In Floyd v. State,536 the First District held that an eighty-year sentence 
was the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole and thus con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment.537  However, in Henry v. State,538 the 
Fifth District concluded that a ninety-year aggregate term-of-years sentence, 
without the possibility of parole, for multiple nonhomicide offenses was not 
a de facto life sentence under Graham.539  The court did make the following 
observation: 
There is language in the Graham majority opinion that suggests 
that no matter the number of offenses or victims or type of crime, a 
juvenile may not receive a sentence that will cause him to spend 
his entire life incarcerated without a chance for rehabilitation, in 
which case it would make no logical difference whether the sen-
tence is “life” or 107 years.  Without any tools to work with, how-
  
 530. Id. 
 531. Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d 45, 47 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam); Gridine v. 
State (Gridine I), 89 So. 3d 909, 911 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Thomas v. State, 78 So. 3d 
644, 646 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam). 
 532. 78 So. 3d 644 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam). 
 533. Id. at 646. 
 534. 89 So. 3d 909 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 535. Gridine v. State (Gridine II), 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1264, D1264 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 
May 29, 2012) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also Gridine I, 89 So. 3d at 911; Graham 
v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 536. 87 So. 3d 45 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
 537. Id. at 45, 47; see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
 538. 82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 539. Id. at 1086, 1089; see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
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ever, we can only apply Graham as it is written.  If the Supreme 
Court has more in mind, it will have to say what that is.540 
The issue was reframed by Judge Padovano in a concurring opinion in 
Smith v. State,541 where he criticized judicial efforts to determine whether a 
particular sentence of a term-of-years without parole is a de facto life sen-
tence.542  These efforts are misdirected, he wrote, because the question under 
Graham is not whether a defendant “will . . . have a meaningful portion of 
his life left” upon release or “a significant part of his life remaining at the 
end of the sentence.”543  Instead, the question is “whether the defendant will 
have a reasonable opportunity to show that he has been rehabilitated during 
the course of the sentence and is therefore deserving of release at some point 
before the sentence expires.”544 
In Miller v. Alabama (Miller II),545 the Supreme Court of the United 
States held, in a five-to-four decision, that mandatory sentences of life with-
out the possibility of parole are unconstitutional for juvenile offenders con-
victed of homicide.546  Such sentences violate the Eighth Amendment’s pro-
hibition of cruel and unusual punishment, the Court wrote, because they dis-
allow individualized sentencing that considers the age and maturity of the 
offender, the “family and home environment,” and the nature and circums-
tances of the crime.547  Absent these considerations, the Court explained, 
mandatory life-without-parole “poses too great a risk of disproportionate 
punishment.”548  Both cases addressed on appeal were remanded to the state 
courts to make individualized sentencing decisions.549  While not ruling out 
the possibility that such individualized sentencing might result in a life-
without-parole sentence, the Court opined that “appropriate occasions for 
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”550 
  
 540. Henry, 82 So. 3d at 1089 (footnote omitted); see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
 541. 93 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 542. See id. at 375 (Padovano, J., concurring). 
 543. Id. 
 544. Id. 
 545. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 546. Id. at 2460, 2475, 2477. 
 547. Id. at 2460, 2468. 
 548. Id. at 2469. 
 549. Id. at 2475. 
 550. Miller II, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
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B. Double Jeopardy 
1. Oral Sentencing Error 
An oral sentencing error did not subject a defendant to double jeopardy 
in Dunbar v. State (Dunbar II),551 the Supreme Court of Florida held.552  This 
case began when “the trial court orally pronounced a life sentence for [Dun-
bar’s conviction for] robbery with a firearm” without mentioning “the ten-
year mandatory minimum sentence” for that crime.553  The judge corrected 
the error in a written order on the same day.554  On appeal, the defendant ar-
gued that the late addition of the mandatory minimum violated his double 
jeopardy rights.555  The Fifth District disagreed, explaining that “the later 
addition of harsher terms” did not implicate double jeopardy concerns “be-
cause the original sentence was invalid.”556  Dunbar sought review of this 
decision for express and direct conflict with the Second District’s decision in 
Gardner v. State.557  The Supreme Court of Florida held that double jeopardy 
concerns were not implicated in Dunbar’s case because defendants have “no 
legitimate expectation of finality” of invalid sentences.558  “[I]f the prosecu-
tion had properly appealed the sentence as orally pronounced, the sentence 
would have been reversed and remanded with instructions to impose the 
term,” the court observed.559  Nevertheless, the court remanded the case for 
resentencing on the ground that the defendant had a due process right to be 
present when the terms of his sentence were increased even though no new 
evidence would be produced at that hearing.560  Chief Justice Charles T. Ca-
nady dissented from this latter part of the majority’s opinion, writing that the 
defendant’s presence would not “‘contribute to the fairness of the proce-
  
 551. 89 So. 3d 901 (Fla. 2012).  
 552. Id. at 906–07. 
 553. Id. at 903 (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.087(2) (2012); Dunbar v. State (Dunbar I), 46 So. 
3d 81, 82–83 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (en banc), review granted, 58 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 
2011), and approved in part, quashed in part, 89 So. 3d 901 (Fla. 2012)). 
 554. Id. (citing Dunbar I, 46 So. 3d at 82). 
 555. Id. at 904. 
 556. Dunbar II, 89 So. 3d at 903 (citing Dunbar I, 46 So. 3d at 83). 
 557. Id. at 902–03 (citing Gardner v. State, 30 So. 3d 629, 632 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2010)). 
 558. Id. at 906. 
 559. Id. (citing State v. Scanes, 973 So. 2d 659, 661 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008); State v. 
Couch, 896 So. 2d 799, 799–800 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam); State v. Straz-
dins, 890 So. 2d 334, 334 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Brendell, 656 So. 2d 594, 594 
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)). 
 560. Id. at 907 (citing Jackson v. State, 767 So. 2d 1156, 1160 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam)). 
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dure,’”561 but rather would be useless in light of the sentencing court’s duty 
to impose the minimum sentence. 562 
2. Separate Offenses 
Although the rule of double jeopardy “prohibits subjecting a person to 
multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal 
offense, . . . no constitutional prohibition [exists] against multiple punish-
ments for different offenses arising out of the same criminal transaction as 
long as the Legislature intends to authorize separate punishments.”563  Absent 
clear legislative intent, however, courts utilize section 775.021(4)(b) of the 
Florida Statutes to determine whether separate offenses exist.564  That section 
sets out three exceptions to the general rule that the legislature intends “‘to 
convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of 
one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as 
set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent.’”565 
One of these exceptions, section 775.021(4)(b)(2), precludes multiple 
convictions for offenses that are “degrees of the same offense as provided by 
statute.”566  In Valdes v. State,567 the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted 
this section to preclude multiple convictions for crimes arising from the same 
criminal transaction if these crimes are “degrees of the same offense” as pro-
vided by statute.568  Shortly after Valdes was decided, however, a conflict 
arose between two district courts of appeal.569  In Shazer v. State,570 the 
Fourth District held that “dual convictions for robbery with a deadly weapon 
  
 561. Dunbar II, 89 So. 3d at 908 (Canady, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 
482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987)). 
 562. Id. (citing Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745). 
 563. Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 2009) (citing Hayes v. State, 803 So. 2d 
695, 699 (Fla. 2001)). 
 564. Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 700 (citing Sirmons v. State, 634 So. 2d 153, 153–54 (Fla. 
1994) (per curiam)).  Section 775.021(4)(b) prohibits multiple convictions and punishments 
for “(1) [o]ffenses which require identical elements of proof; (2) [o]ffenses which are degrees 
of the same offense as provided by statute; [and] (3) [o]ffenses which are lesser offenses the 
statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.”  FLA. STAT. § 
775.021(4)(b)(1)–(3) (2012). 
 565. Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1072 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)). 
 566. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)(2). 
 567. 3 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 2009). 
 568. Id. at 1077 (construing FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)(2)). 
 569. See id. at 1078; McKinney v. State (McKinney I), 24 So. 3d 682, 683–84 (Fla. 5th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 66 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 527 (2011); 
Shazer v. State, 3 So. 3d 453, 454 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam). 
 570. 3 So. 3d 453 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam). 
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and grand theft violate[d] double jeopardy rights because the same property 
formed the basis for both convictions.”571  However, in McKinney v. State 
(McKinney I),572 the Fifth District disagreed, holding that the rule against 
double jeopardy is not violated by dual convictions for grand theft and rob-
bery with a firearm arising out of “a single taking of cash and a cell phone at 
gunpoint.”573  Reasoning that “robbery is not a degree of theft nor is theft a 
degree of robbery,” the court upheld McKinney’s convictions and certified 
express and direct conflict with Shazer.574 
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction in McKinney v. 
State (McKinney II),575 affirmed the Fifth District’s decision in McKinney I, 
and disapproved Shazer.576  The latter decision, the court wrote, “failed to 
follow Valdes in its decision, or to note a reason for its departure from con-
trolling precedent.”577  In so ruling, the court addressed three of McKinney’s 
arguments.578  First, the court dismissed his claim “that robbery and theft are 
simply aggravated forms of the same underlying offense.”579  Because “rob-
bery is not a degree of theft [and theft is not] a degree of robbery,” section 
775.021(4)(b)2. did not bar McKinney’s dual convictions for these crimes.580  
Second, McKinney’s convictions were not exempt under section 
775.021(4)(b)1., which precludes multiple convictions for offenses requiring 
identical elements of proof.581  “Robbery requires that the State show that 
‘force, violence, assault, or putting in fear was used in the course of the tak-
ing,’ and grand theft requires that the State show the value of the property 
taken,” the court wrote.582  For the same reason, the court rejected his third 
argument that section 775.021(4)(b)3. barred his dual convictions because 
grand theft was a lesser-included offense of robbery, reasoning that “neither 
offense is wholly subsumed by the other.”583 
Justice Lewis wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Quince 
joined, criticizing the court’s decision in Valdes as “wrong when this Court 
  
 571. Id. at 454 (reversing the grand theft conviction and remanding with directions to the 
trial court to vacate the conviction and sentence). 
 572. 24 So. 3d 682 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 66 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 527 (2011). 
 573. Id. at 683–84. 
 574. Id. at 684 (citing Shazer, 3 So. 3d at 454). 
 575. 66 So. 3d 852, 853 (Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 527 (2011). 
 576. Id. 
 577. Id. at 856 n.4. 
 578. See id. at 856–57 (quoting McKinney I, 24 So. 3d at 683–84). 
 579. Id. (citing McKinney I, 24 So. 3d at 684). 
 580. McKinney I, 24 So. 3d at 684; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)2. (2012). 
 581. See McKinney II, 66 So. 3d at 854, 856–57; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)1. 
 582. McKinney II, 66 So. 3d at 857 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 812.13(1)). 
 583. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)3. 
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issued it, and . . . wrong in application today.”584  Valdes, he stated, “departed 
from decades of well-established law” when it discarded the primary evil 
approach to double jeopardy challenges “[w]ithout reference to any decision-
al law from this Court or Florida’s district courts of appeal that exhibited the 
impracticality of that approach, any necessity to abrogate it, or any miscar-
riage of justice . . . .”585  Grand theft and robbery “involve the same evil,” he 
continued, because each crime punishes the defendant for depriving another 
person of property.586  Therefore, according to the dissent, dual convictions 
for grand theft and robbery “in a single episode and single act punish[] an 
individual twice for the same evil and violate[] double jeopardy.”587 
In Ivey v. State,588 the Third District considered Valdes in the context of 
convictions for leaving the scene of a fatal accident, vehicular homicide, and 
DUI manslaughter.589  Holding “that Valdes did not overrule the well-settled 
principle that a single death cannot give rise to dual homicide convictions,” 
the court concluded that the dual homicide convictions arising from a single 
death violated double jeopardy.590  The court therefore “vacate[d] the convic-
tions for vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of a fatal accident, and 
affirm[ed] the DUI manslaughter conviction and sentence.”591 
In Avila v. State,592 the Second District held that double jeopardy did not 
preclude a defendant’s retrial after the jury deadlocked on that charge at the 
defendant's first trial.593  In this case, the defendant was charged, inter alia, 
with sexual battery with a deadly weapon.594  After a preliminary vote, the 
first jury sent a note to the court advising that there was unanimous agree-
ment to a lesser charge on the sexual battery count, but no agreement on the 
  
 584. See McKinney II, 66 So. 3d at 857, 859 (Lewis, J., dissenting); see also Valdes v. 
State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1078 (Fla. 2009). 
 585. McKinney II, 66 So. 3d at 857–58 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (citing Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 
1075). 
 586. Id. at 859. 
 587. Id. 
 588. 47 So. 3d 908 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam). 
 589. See id. at 910–11; see also Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1078. 
 590. Ivey, 47 So. 3d at 911. 
 591. Id.; see also State v. Merriex, 42 So. 3d 934, 936 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (hold-
ing that the defendant’s conviction for third-degree felony murder barred him from being 
convicted for vehicular homicide for the death of the same victim). 
 592. 86 So. 3d 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 593. Id. at 516; see also Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2053 (2012) (holding that 
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial on murder charges where a trial judge de-
clared a mistrial after a jury reported that it had unanimously voted to acquit on murder 
charges but had reached an impasse on a charged lesser-included offense). 
 594. Avila, 86 So. 3d at 512. 
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false imprisonment count.595  At the court’s request, the jury returned to deli-
berations, ultimately deadlocking on the sexual battery count.596  The defen-
dant was convicted on that count when he was retried.597  On appeal, Avila 
argued that this conviction violated double jeopardy because the jury's note 
in the first trial reflecting unanimity should be binding.598  The Second Dis-
trict disagreed, concluding that double jeopardy could be triggered only by 
an “actual verdict,” which must be “announced in the courtroom in the pres-
ence of the jurors and the defendant.”599  Neither the jury’s preliminary vote 
in the jury room nor its deadlock on the lesser charge constituted an actual 
verdict, the court ruled, so double jeopardy did not prevent the State from 
retrying Avila on the sexual battery charge.600  Accordingly, the court af-
firmed Avila’s convictions and sentences.601 
In Headley v. State,602 the Third District held that a defendant could be 
convicted of an “aggravated white collar crime and the underlying predicate” 
crimes without violating double jeopardy guarantees.603  Analyzing the lan-
guage, structure, and legislative intent of the white collar crime statute, the 
court concluded that the statute sought to enhance punishment by establish-
ing “a separate and distinct offense” from the predicate crimes.604  This con-
clusion was reinforced by cases holding that double jeopardy is not violated 
when separate punishments are imposed for RICO crimes and the predicate 
crimes that comprise the racketeering pattern, the court explained.605 
In State v. Morse,606 the Fifth District held that conviction and punish-
ment for two charges of attempted second-degree murder of the same person 
in two different counties did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right 
  
 595. Id. 
 596. Id. at 512–13. 
 597. Id. at 513. 
 598. Id. 
 599. Avila, 86 So. 3d at 514; see also Delgado v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 659 F.3d 1311, 
1326–27 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Supreme Court of Florida’s setting aside of a de-
fendant's original convictions for a “legal ‘error in the proceedings,’” rather than for factual 
insufficiency, did not constitute an acquittal that triggered double jeopardy protection) (quot-
ing United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964)). 
 600. Avila, 86 So. 3d at 516. 
 601. Id. 
 602. 90 So. 3d 912 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
 603. Id. at 915. 
 604. Id. (citing State v. Traylor, 77 So. 3d 224, 226–27 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per 
curiam)). 
 605. See id.; see also Gross v. State, 728 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), re-
view granted, 741 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1999); Haggerty v. State, 531 So. 2d 364, 365 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
 606. 77 So. 3d 748 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam). 
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against double jeopardy where each attempt was a separate criminal epi-
sode.607  Morse’s crimes were committed in both Orange County and Semi-
nole County in the course of a police chase.608  During the chase in Orange 
County, he repeatedly turned from the wheel of his vehicle to shoot at the 
pursuing officer, reloaded his firearm, and then fired again after both ve-
hicles crossed into Seminole County.609  He was “convicted and sentenced in 
Seminole County for the [crime] he committed there.”610  After his convic-
tion in Orange County, however, the trial judge ruled that double jeopardy 
considerations entitled Morse to a new trial.611  On appeal by the State, the 
Fifth District held that the two shootings were separate criminal episodes 
because they were separated by “obvious time and distance,” and the defen-
dant had numerous opportunities “to pause and reflect on his actions as he 
repeatedly ceased and then restarted” shooting at his pursuers.612  Thus, pu-
nishments for both shootings would not violate defendant's right against 
double jeopardy.613 
C. Due Process 
1. Uncharged Crimes 
In Jaimes v. State (Jaimes II),614 the Supreme Court of Florida held that 
a jury instruction resulting in the defendant's conviction for an uncharged 
crime violated his due process rights and constituted fundamental error.615  In 
this case, the defendant was charged with aggravated battery with a deadly 
weapon but the jury convicted him of the uncharged crime of aggravated 
battery causing great bodily harm.616  On appeal, Jaimes argued that it was an 
error to convict him of an uncharged crime.617  The Second District affirmed, 
however, because the failure to object to the flawed jury instructions and 
  
 607. Id. at 751. 
 608. Id. at 749. 
 609. Id. at 751. 
 610. Id. at 749. 
 611. Morse, 77 So. 3d at 749. 
 612. Id. at 751 (citing Beahr v. State, 992 So. 2d 844, 846 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008), 
abrogated on other grounds by Smith v. State, 41 So. 3d 1041 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010)). 
 613. Id. (citing Beahr, 992 So. 2d at 846). 
 614. 51 So. 3d 445 (Fla. 2010). 
 615. Id. at 449, 451 (citing State v. Gray, 435 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 1983)). 
 616. Id. at 447 (emphasis omitted); see also FLA. STAT. § 784.045(1)(a) (2012). 
 617. Jaimes II, 51 So. 3d at 447 (citing Jaimes v. State (Jaimes I), 19 So. 3d 347, 348 (Fla. 
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam), review granted, 29 So. 3d 291 (Fla. 2010), and rev’d, 51 
So. 3d 445 (Fla. 2010)). 
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verdict form did not constitute fundamental error.618  Jaimes sought review 
on the ground that the Second District’s decision was in conflict with the 
decision of the state high court in State v. Weaver.”619 
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed, holding that the defendant’s con-
viction for aggravated battery violated his due process rights because it was 
based on causing great bodily harm, “which requires an element not con-
tained in the charging document” and therefore not addressed at trial.620  The 
erroneous jury instruction that resulted in this conviction constituted funda-
mental error “by definition,” the court held, and was subject to correction on 
appeal even in the absence of contemporaneous objection.621  In so ruling, the 
court distinguished its decision in Weaver, which held that a trial court’s 
error in instructing on an alternative theory does not constitute fundamental 
error when that alternative theory is never at issue in the trial and “it may be 
assumed that the defendant was convicted of the form of the offense on 
which the state actually based its arguments.”622  In Jaimes II, however, the 
verdict was based specifically on the jury’s determination that Jaimes had 
caused the victim great bodily harm, and so the court could not assume, as it 
had done “in Weaver, that the improper instruction had no effect on the 
jury’s decision.”623  In such case, the fundamental error exception is justified 
based on a violation of the defendant’s due process rights.624  Accordingly, 
the court directed entry of a verdict for the lesser included crime of simple 
battery, which was “supported by the charging document and the proof at 
trial, and each element of the offense was determined by the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”625 
The Second District followed Jaimes II in Harris v. State,626 where the 
defendant was charged with attempted robbery with a firearm but convicted 
of robbery with a firearm after evidence was presented at trial that the rob-
bery had been completed.627  On appeal, the court reversed and remanded for 
a new trial, citing Jaimes II as authority for the conclusion that due process is 
denied when a defendant is convicted “of a crime that the State has not 
  
 618. Id. (quoting Jaimes I, 19 So. 3d at 348). 
 619. Id. at 447–48 (citing State v. Weaver, 957 So. 2d 586, 589 (Fla. 2007), abrogated by 
Sanders v. State, 959 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007), overruled by Beasley v. State, 
971 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). 
 620. Id. at 449. 
 621. Id. 
 622. Jaimes II, 51 So. 3d at 451 (citing Weaver, 957 So. 2d at 589). 
 623. Id.; see Weaver, 957 So. 2d at 589. 
 624. Jaimes II, 51 So. 3d at 451 (citing State v. Gray, 435 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 1983)). 
 625. Id. at 452 (citing State v. Sigler, 967 So. 2d 835, 842 (Fla. 2007)). 
 626. 76 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 627. Id. at 1081 (citing Jaimes II, 51 So. 3d at 451). 
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charged.”628  The court rejected the State’s argument that the case should be 
remanded for sentencing on attempted robbery because there was no evi-
dence or finding that the robbery was incomplete, as would be required for 
an attempt conviction.629  The court cautioned that, on remand, “the State 
may not be limited to proceeding on the existing charge of attempted robbery 
with a firearm.”630  In other words, the State could charge Harris with the 
completed robbery, thereby exposing him “to the same mandatory life sen-
tence he is currently serving.”631 
2. Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
Section 893.13 of the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act (the Act) provides that, except as otherwise authorized, “it is 
unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with in-
tent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance” or “to be in ac-
tual or constructive possession of a controlled substance.”632  Section 
893.101 specifies “that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled sub-
stance is not an element of” a drug possession or distribution charge.633  In-
stead, the accused may establish lack of knowledge as an affirmative de-
fense.634  When this affirmative defense is raised, actual or constructive pos-
session “shall give rise to a permissive presumption that the possessor knew 
of the illicit nature of the substance.”635  In Shelton v. Secretary, Department 
of Corrections,636 the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida held that section 893.13 violates due process and is unconstitutional 
on its face.637  In arriving at this conclusion, Judge Scriven characterized 
Florida’s law as a “draconian” approach that subjects an innocent actor to 
“the Hobson’s choice of pleading guilty or going to trial where he . . . must 
  
 628. Id. at 1081, 1083 (citing Jaimes II, 51 So. 3d at 448); see also Deleon v. State, 66 So. 
3d 391, 394–95 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that, where the defendant was charged 
with carjacking with a firearm, it was fundamental error to instruct the jury on the uncharged 
offense of carjacking with a deadly weapon, which was not a lesser-included crime of the 
charged offense). 
 629. Harris, 76 So. 3d at 1082–83. 
 630. Id. at 1083. 
 631. Id. (Villanti, J., concurring). 
 632. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(1)(a), (6)(a) (2012). 
 633. Id. § 893.101(2). 
 634. Id. 
 635. Id. § 893.101(3). 
 636. 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Fla. 2011), rev’d, 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 637. Id. at 1297; see also FLA. STAT. § 893.13. 
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then prove his innocence for lack of knowledge against the permissive pre-
sumption the statute imposes that he does in fact have guilty knowledge.”638 
Almost immediately, Florida’s trial courts were inundated with “Shel-
ton motions” seeking to dismiss drug possession and trafficking charges on 
the ground that section 893.13 was unconstitutional.639  The district courts of 
appeal were quick to respond, uniformly concluding that section 893.13 does 
not violate the requirements of due process.640  In State v. Adkins (Adkins 
I),641 however, the Second District declined to consider the merits of Shelton 
and instead certified the constitutional issue to the Supreme Court of Florida 
for immediate resolution.642  The court accepted jurisdiction and rendered its 
opinion on July 12, 2012.643  Concluding that section 893.13 is constitutional, 
the court deferred to the legislature’s broad authority to define the elements 
of a crime, while “recogniz[ing] that due process ordinarily does not prec-
lude the creation of an offense without a guilty knowledge element.”644  The 
court then considered “the limited circumstances in which the absence of a 
guilty knowledge element has resulted in a holding that the requirements of 
  
 638. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1295, 1308. 
 639. See e.g., State v. Washington (Washington I), 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1129, 1129, 
1133 (11th Cir. Ct. Aug. 17, 2011) (finding Shelton to be binding on state trial courts and 
dismissing thirty-nine cases on the ground that section 893.13 was unconstitutional), rev’d, 37 
Fla. L. Weekly D1535 (3d Dist. Ct. App. June 27, 2012); State v. Barnett, No. 11-CF-003124, 
slip op. at 3, 6 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (finding Shelton to constitute persuasive 
authority in state trial courts, but holding that the legislature had not entirely eliminated the 
element of knowledge from section 893.13 because a “general intent [element] remains in-
tact”); see also FLA. STAT. § 893.13; State v. Anderson, No. F99-12435(A), slip op. at 3, 6 
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Aug. 11, 2011) (holding that state trial courts are barred from following 
Shelton because the state appellate courts have upheld the constitutionality of section 893.13). 
 640. State v. Washington (Washington II), 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1535, D1538 (3d Dist. Ct. 
App. June 27, 2012); Maestas v. State, 76 So. 3d 991, 993–94, 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2011); Lanier v. State, 74 So. 3d 1130, 1131 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Flagg v. 
State, 74 So. 3d 138, 141 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011)); see McCain v. State, 84 So. 3d 1284, 
1284 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Flagg, 74 So. 3d at 141); Holcy v. 
State, 83 So. 3d 778, 778 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Flagg, 74 So. 3d 
at 141); Williams v. State, 45 So. 3d 14, 15–16 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam), 
review denied, 53 So. 3d 1022 (Fla. 2011); Harris v. State, 932 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam); see also FLA. STAT. § 893.13; Mack v. State, 91 So. 3d 868, 869 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming the denial of the defendant’s motion for post-
conviction relief because Shelton applied only to the amended version of section 893.13 and 
not to the version of statute that governed his actions in 2001). 
 641. 71 So. 3d 184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.) (per curiam), review granted, 71 So. 3d 117 
(Fla. 2011). 
 642. Id. at 185–86. 
 643. State v. Adkins (Adkins II), 37 Fla. L. Weekly S449, S449 (July 12, 2012). 
 644. Id. at S450. 
62
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss1/2
2012] CRIMINAL LAW:  2010–2012 SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW 63 
 
due process were not satisfied.”645  The statutes were found unconstitutional 
in those cases, the court explained, because they penalized omissions that 
otherwise amounted to innocent conduct, criminalized constitutionally pro-
tected conduct, or were not rationally related to achieving a legitimate legis-
lative purpose.646 
The court advanced several reasons in support of its conclusion.  First, 
because the State is required to prove the defendant’s “affirmative act of 
selling, manufacturing, delivering, or possessing a controlled substance,” the 
statute does not punish inaction.647  Second, the statute does not penalize 
innocent conduct without notice, given that lack of knowledge may be as-
serted as an affirmative defense.648  Third, sections 893.13 and 893.101 do 
not impinge on any constitutionally protected rights or freedoms, particularly 
as “[t]here is no [protected] right to possess contraband” or “to be ignorant of 
the nature of the property in one’s possession.”649  Fourth, “‘common sense 
and experience’” support a conclusion that “possession without awareness of 
the illicit nature of the substance is highly unusual.”650  Fifth, section 893.13 
is “rationally related to the Legislature’s goal of controlling substances that 
have a high potential for abuse” because it is narrowly tailored to permit 
medical use and handling of controlled substances and “to prohibit non-
medically necessary uses of those substances.”651  Finally, the “decision to 
[define] lack of . . . knowledge as an affirmative defense does not unconstitu-
tionally shift the burden of proof of a criminal offense to the defendant” be-
cause it does not require the defendant to refute an element that the State is 
required to prove in order to convict.652  To the contrary, the court wrote, the 
affirmative defense provides the defendant with the opportunity to concede 
the elements of the crime while explaining why the crime should not be pu-
nished.653  Accordingly, the court reversed the circuit court’s order granting 
the motions to dismiss.654 
  
 645. Id. 
 646. Id. at S451. 
 647. Id. at S452. 
 648. Adkins II, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S452. 
 649. Id. (citing Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417 (1970)); see FLA. STAT. §§ 
893.101, .13 (2012). 
 650. Adkins II, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S452 (quoting Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 
845 (1973)) (citing United States v. Bunton, No. 8:10-cr-327-T-30EAJ, 2011 WL 5080307, at 
*8 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2011)). 
 651. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 893.13. 
 652. Adkins II, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S452. 
 653. Id. at S453. 
 654. Id. 
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Justice Pariente concurred in the result but wrote separately to state that 
she would not rule out a successful “as-applied challenge . . . on due process 
grounds” if criminalizing the innocent conduct of a specific defendant would 
subject that individual to a substantial prison term.655  The relevant standard 
jury instruction supports such a challenge, she explained, because it allows a 
jury to presume a defendant’s guilty knowledge once “the affirmative de-
fense is raised.”656  Justice Perry dissented, writing that the majority’s deci-
sion “shatters bedrock constitutional principles and builds on a foundation of 
flawed ‘common sense.’”657  Innocent possession is more common than the 
court stated, he wrote, and the permissive presumption of guilty knowledge 
requires an innocent defendant “to shoulder the burden of proof and present 
evidence to overcome that presumption.”658  This, he concluded, “makes nei-
ther legal nor common sense, . . . offends all notions of due process, and 
threatens core principles of the presumption of innocence and burden of 
proof.”659 
D. Ex Post Facto Laws 
In Shenfeld v. State (Shenfeld II),660 the Supreme Court of Florida ex-
amined the constitutional provision prohibiting ex post facto laws.661  At is-
sue was whether an amendment to a probation tolling statute, which allows 
adjudication of a probation violation without an arrest warrant, “may consti-
tutionally be applied to a probationer who was placed on probation before 
the amendment became effective.” 662  In this case, based on the new tolling 
law and alleged probation violations, the trial court revoked Shenfeld’s pro-
bation and sentenced him to fifteen years.663  The Fourth District affirmed, 
holding that the amendment was merely procedural and did not deprive the 
trial court of jurisdiction to revoke Shenfeld’s probation and to sentence 
  
 655. Id. (Pariente, J., concurring). 
 656. Id. at S455 (citing FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 25.2 (2007)). 
 657. Adkins II, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S456 (Perry, J., dissenting). 
 658. Id. at S457 (citing Stimus v. State, 995 So. 2d 1149, 1151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 
2008)). 
 659. Id. at S458. 
 660. 44 So. 3d 96 (Fla. 2010). 
 661. Id. at 98; see also FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 10. 
 662. Shenfeld II, 44 So. 3d at 98; see also FLA. CONST. art 1, § 10; FLA. STAT. § 948.06(1) 
(2001) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 948.06(1)(a) (2012)). 
 663. Shenfeld II, 44 So. 3d at 99; see also Shenfeld v. State (Shenfeld I), 14 So. 3d 1021, 
1023 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 29 So. 3d 292 (Fla. 2009), and aff’d, 44 So. 3d 
96 (Fla. 2010). 
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him.664  Approving this decision, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded 
that the amended tolling provision did not fall within any of the four catego-
ries of ex post facto laws because it did not criminalize an act that was inno-
cent when the law passed, aggravate a crime previously committed, inflict a 
greater punishment than that in effect when the crime was committed, or 
change the proof necessary to convict.665  Instead, the court held, it merely 
modified the applicable tolling procedures.666  The amendment was analog-
ous to a “statutory extension of a statute of limitations” that takes effect be-
fore prosecution is time-barred, the court wrote, concluding that if the limita-
tions period for prosecution “may constitutionally be extended before the 
prosecution has been time-barred, it follows that a [tolling provision] may be 
applied to [an unexpired] probationary term.”667 
In Witchard v. State,668 the Fourth District held that retroactive imposi-
tion of mandatory electronic monitoring provisions to the defendant’s crimes 
violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws.669  In this case, the rele-
vant statute took effect after Witchard’s crimes were committed.670  Because 
it mandated a greater punishment than that in effect when he committed his 
crimes, its retroactive application violated the constitutional prohibition 
against ex post facto laws.671  The court remanded the case “‘for resentencing 
to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine whether elec-
tronic monitoring should be imposed.’”672 
E. Freedom of Speech and Association 
The constitutionality of Florida’s vehicle noise statute was the subject 
of two district court opinions during the survey period.673  Section 316.3045, 
the statute at issue, makes it unlawful for the sound from a car stereo system 
to be “[p]lainly audible at a distance of 25 feet or more from the motor ve-
hicle,” except when that vehicle uses sound making devices in the normal 
  
 664. Shenfeld I, 14 So. 3d at 1024. 
 665. Shenfeld II, 44 So. 3d at 100–02 (citing Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 612 
(2003)). 
 666. Id. at 101. 
 667. Id. 
 668. 68 So. 3d 407 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 669. Id. at 409, 411. 
 670. Id. at 408; see FLA. STAT. § 948.063(1) (2012). 
 671. Witchard, 68 So. 3d at 409, 410–11. 
 672. Id. at 411 (quoting Donohue v. State, 979 So. 2d 1060, 1062 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2008) (per curiam)). 
 673. Montgomery v. State, 69 So. 3d 1023, 1031–32 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011); State 
v. Catalano, 60 So. 3d 1139, 1141–42 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
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course of “business or political purposes.”674  In State v. Catalano,675 the 
Second District held that the statute is unconstitutional for two reasons.676  
First, it is not content-neutral because it “does not ‘apply equally to music, 
political speech, and advertising.’”677  Second, no compelling governmental 
interest requires the different treatment of amplified music and political or 
commercial speech.678  Accordingly, the court denied the petition and certi-
fied the following question of great public importance:  “Is the ‘plainly audi-
ble’ language in section 316.3045(1)(a), Florida Statutes, unconstitutionally 
vague, overbroad, arbitrarily enforceable, or impinging on free speech 
rights? ”679 
The Fifth District reached the same result in Montgomery v. State,680 
where the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence 
obtained when his vehicle was stopped for a noise violation.681  The appellate 
court rejected Montgomery’s vagueness challenge on the ground that the 
statute “provides fair notice of the prohibited conduct” and clear guidelines 
to those charged with its enforcement.682  The overbreadth challenge was 
meritorious, however, because the statute “distinguish[es] between different 
types of recorded noise or particular viewpoints.”683  The court nevertheless 
upheld Montgomery’s conviction on the ground that the officer’s good faith 
reliance on the statute was objectively reasonable and could not serve as an 
exception to the exclusionary rule.684 
In Enoch v. State,685 the First District struck down section 874.11 of the 
Florida Statutes, which prohibits certain electronic communication by crimi-
nal gangs, but upheld section 874.05(1), which makes it a felony to recruit 
new gang members if commission of a crime is a condition of membership or 
continued membership.686  The court first addressed the question whether 
  
 674. FLA. STAT. § 316.3045 (2012), declared unconstitutional by Montgomery v. State, 69 
So. 3d 1023 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011), State v. Catalano, 60 So. 3d 1139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2011). 
 675. 60 So. 3d 1139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 676. Id. at 1144, 1146. 
 677. Id. at 1146 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 
(1993)). 
 678. Id. at 1144. 
 679. Id. (emphasis added). 
 680. 69 So. 3d 1023 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 681. Id. at 1025–26, 1033. 
 682. Id. at 1027–28; see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 15B-13.001 (2006). 
 683. Montgomery, 69 So. 3d at 1031–32. 
 684. Id. at 1033. 
 685. 95 So. 3d 344 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 686. Id. at 347–48.  The court also held that, because Enoch actually “engaged in specific 
conduct each statute proscribes,” he lacked standing to raise a vagueness challenge “as applied 
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these statutes violate the freedoms of speech and association.687  Both statutes 
were subject to a strict scrutiny analysis, the court stated, because they are 
content-based laws that focus on the recruiter’s words and conduct.688  The 
court concluded that both statutes serve compelling state interests, because 
they were aimed at preventing crime.689  However, only the gang recruitment 
statute was narrowly tailored to achieve this goal “without impermissibly 
intruding upon the rights of law-abiding persons or, for that matter, the dis-
crete lawful activities of gang members.”690  Moreover, because the statute is 
limited to speech that intentionally furthers criminal activity, it did not dis-
pense with a scienter requirement or reach protected speech as Enoch 
claimed.691  Finally, the recruitment statute did not violate the freedom of 
association, the court held, because “whatever associational rights a criminal 
gang may have, such rights do not extend to the inevitable and imminent 
criminal or delinquent conduct proscribed in section 874.05(1).”692  The First 
District, therefore, affirmed Enoch’s conviction and sentence under section 
874.05(1).693 
On the other hand, the court held that section 874.11, the electronic 
communications statute, was unconstitutionally overbroad and offended 
substantive due process.694  Because its “sweeping language” criminalizes 
innocent communications “without reference to actual or imminent criminal 
activity,” it impermissibly prohibits expressive and associational activity that 
seeks “to benefit, promote, or further even the non-criminal interests of a 
criminal gang.”695  Accordingly, the court reversed Enoch’s conviction and 
sentence under section 874.11.696 
  
to the hypothetically innocent conduct of others.”  Id. at 365–66 (citing Bryant v. State, 712 
So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)). 
 687. Id. at 350. 
 688. Id. at 350, 357 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811–
13 (2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1944)). 
 689. Enoch, 95 So. 3d at 351–52, 357 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 
(1982); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1116–17 (Fla. 2004); State v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d 479, 
482 (Fla. 1995)). 
 690. Id. at 355 (citing FLA. STAT. § 874.02(1) (2012)). 
 691. Id. at 352–53; see also FLA. STAT. § 874.05(1). 
 692. Enoch, 95 So. 3d at 357 (citing State v. Beasley, 317 So. 2d 750, 753 (Fla. 1975)); 
see also FLA. STAT. § 874.05(1). 
 693. Enoch, 95 So. 3d at 366; see also FLA. STAT. § 874.05(1). 
 694. Enoch, 95 So. 3d at 358, 364; see also FLA. STAT. § 874.11 (2012), declared uncons-
titutional by Enoch v. State, 95 So. 3d 344 (2012). 
 695. Enoch, 95 So. 3d at 358, 364 (citing City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d 259, 264 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996)). 
 696. Id. at 366; see also FLA. STAT. § 874.11. 
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F. The Right to Bear Arms 
In a brief opinion in Epps v. State,697 the First District upheld the consti-
tutionality of a Florida statute making possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon unlawful.698  The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the sta-
tute violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms and found that recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States did not undermine state 
precedent upholding the constitutionality of section 790.23(1)(a) of the Flor-
ida Statutes.699  Those cases were distinguishable, the court wrote, because 
they involved broad state prohibitions against possession of handguns by 
“general populations . . . within the home for self-defense.”700  They did not 
call into question the validity of “‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms 
by felons.’”701  The First District therefore affirmed Epps’ conviction.702 
V. CONCLUSION 
During the survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida settled several 
conflicts among Florida’s District Courts of Appeal and interpreted a number 
of statutes, defenses, common law doctrines, and constitutional principles.  
The district courts were active as well, certifying several conflicts and ques-
tions of great public importance to the court.  The appellate courts also 
struggled with the proper application of Montgomery II to myriad issues in-
volving the jury instructions for manslaughter and attempted manslaughter.  
The resulting confusion will not be resolved until the court approves separate 
jury instructions for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. 
  
 697. 55 So. 3d 710 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 698. Id. at 711 (citing FLA. STAT. § 790.23(1)(a)). 
 699. Id. (citing McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047, 3050 (2010); District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)); see also FLA. STAT. § 790.23(1)(a). 
 700. Epps, 55 So. 3d at 711 (citing McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047, 3050; Heller, 554 U.S. 
at 635). 
 701. Id. (quoting McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626). 
 702. Id. 
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